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1. Introduction 
 
There is still a popular belief that criminal cases are ruled on by judges in a trial. When one 
looks at the facts, it is rather the public prosecutor who tends to play a leading role not only in 
the investigation but also in the decision process. In both the U.S. and European legal systems 
the crucial discretionary power of the prosecutor is to determine which case should be 
disposed of before trial by either dismissal of the charges or by imposing certain obligations 
on suspects in exchange for laying the file aside. Such practices are known as pre-trial 
diversion or informal sanctions.  
Criminal policy reforms in Germany and other European countries turned to non-custodial 
and informal sanctions as a response to the rising crime rates of the 1970s (see Weigend 1995, 
Cherry 2001, Oberwitter and Hoefer 2005, Jehle and Wade 2006, Heinz 2006). The main 
aspect of these reforms was the emphasis on restricting the use of imprisonment. In particular, 
short-term custodial sanctions were driven back in favor of probation and non-custodial 
sentences such as fines. In Germany, in 2005 it was less than every tenth (8.3%) judgment 
that imposed an unconditional prison sentence. In 1950, this share was still at 39.1% (see 
Heinz 2006). Besides constraining unconditional prison sentences, the second pillar of 
criminal policy reforms was to strengthen the role of the public prosecutor in the context of 
pre-trial diversion, which was likewise considered as ‘informal sanctioning’. So prior to 
judicial decisions, a growing share of cases has already been discharged by the public 
prosecutor. The portion of crime suspects formally convicted in a court (under general and 
juvenile penal law) compared to all people sanctioned (informally and formally) steadily 
declined from 63.7% in 1981 to 45.3% in 2005. The prosecutor accounts for the bulk of all 
cases, the court is only responsible for 15% of all dismissals (see Heinz, 2006, for quoted 
figures). 
Criminal policy in the U.S. followed a quite different path. Whereas most Western European 
countries adopted policies of diversion and non-custodial sentences, the U.S. faced the rising 
crime rates of the 1970s by greater incarceration and practicing ‘tough on crime’ strategies 
such as California’s ‘three strikes and you’re out’. As a result, the incarceration rate in the 
U.S. has increased by more than 220 percent between 1980 and 2000 (Cherry 2001), and 
reached the unprecedented number of 738 prisoners per 100,000 of the national population in 
2006 (US Bureau of Justice Statistics).  This rate is more than seven times higher than in 
Germany (95 per 100,000) and most other European countries (e.g. France 85, Sweden 82, 
Italy 104, Austria 105, England & Wales 148; see Walmsley 2007).  
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The policy of increased incarceration leads to much higher expenditures on the criminal 
justice system in the U.S. compared to Europe. However, the crucial question is whether the 
savings from smaller imprisonment rates have been offset by higher costs of crime in 
response to decreasing general deterrence. A first look at German data does not give a clear 
picture: Whereas theft rates were rising throughout the 1970s and 1980s but started declining 
ever since the beginning of the 1990s, German violent crime rates show a continuous upward 
trend and more than doubled since the beginning of the 1970s (GESIS 2007). A look across 
European borders shows that many European countries have experienced a similar increase in 
violent crime, in particular among young people. Aebi (2004) and Oberwittler and Hoefer 
(2005) point at reasons such as poverty, media influences and immigration, but do not see 
lack of deterrence as a potential factor of rising crime rates. 
This paper studies the impact of the ‘being soft on crime’ strategy, characterized by two 
different strategies, namely non-custodial sentences and diversion2, on crime rates in 
Germany. Germany’s 16 states (the German ‘Laender’) enjoy certain autonomy, in particular 
in the areas of law, education, social assistance, and police, within a federal system.  Thus, 
different views, traditions, religious roots and political majorities have led to divergent 
attitudes and political beliefs. This institutional setting makes the German Criminal Law 
Reform of 19693, which introduced the possibility of alternative sanctions into the judicial 
system and strengthened the discretionary power of public prosecutors, a very interesting 
starting point for studying different crime policies. Despite a generally binding German penal 
code, some northern states such as Lower Saxony, Bremen and Schleswig Holstein showed 
high rates of compliance with the fundamental idea of more lenient sanctioning, whereas in 
particular the southern states of Bavaria and Baden-Wuerttemberg continued their 
conservative ‘tough on crime’ criminal policy and were rather reluctant to adopt the liberal 
elements of the Criminal Law Reform. 
To fully understand the long-lasting impact of the reform, in particular the wide scope given 
to prosecutors and the vast range of potential custodial and non-custodial sanctions, the entire 
                                                 
 
2 Formally, criminologists refer to ‘diversion’ as the circumvention of formal sanctioning (or sentencing) of a 
crime suspect who, based on the circumstances of the case, could be successfully prosecuted but whose case is 
dropped conditionally or unconditionally for so-called ‘reasons of expediency’. Diversion can be applied in all 
cases concerning offences which are not punishable by a minimum penalty of one year ore more (see Heinz 2006 
for details). 
 
3 According to German criminologists, the 1969 reform was considered the most important change in criminal 
policy after World War II. The reform, also dubbed the ‘Grand Criminal Law Reform” (Grosse 
Strafrechtsreform), came into force in 1975, and is thus fully covered by the panel data set (1977 – 2001) used in 
this paper. See Busch (2005) and Heinz (2006) for historical details of the reform. 
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underlying mechanism has to be covered, i.e. the interactions of police, prosecutors and courts 
have to be taken into account. To cope with the manifold situation of all stages of the 
prosecution process, theoretical and econometric models need to consider the activities of 
police, public prosecution and courts and require attention of the probability of being arrested 
by the police, the probability of being convicted conditional upon arrest, and the probabilities 
of being imprisoned, being fined or being on probation given conviction. As the Criminal 
Law Reform entailed changes away from short-term custodial sanctions, also the average 
length of prison sentences should be focused on when calculating the expected costs of 
committing a crime. As Mendes and McDonald (2001) and Mustard (2003) argue 
convincingly, components of general deterrence do not work independently of each other. 
Rather, all elements operate in combination. Models that do not reflect the interactions of 
police, public prosecution and courts would fail to translate the economic theory and cause 
severe omitted variable biases.  
In order to overcome this shortcoming, this article is based on a theoretical model that 
considers diversion strategies and distinguishes between custodial and non-custodial 
deterrence. The resulting augmented supply of offences is estimated using a newly established 
and unique database combining information from different sources of official judicial 
statistics covering the German states for the period 1977–2001. It provides offence and age-
specific crime rates of six major offence types and maps the comprehensive system of 
criminal prosecution, including decisions regarding type (fine, probation, imprisonment) and 
severity (length of prison sentence and amount of fine) of punishment. To the best knowledge 
of the authors, so far Wolpin (1978, 1980) and Mustard (2003) are the only authors who 
applied such a comprehensive set of deterrence variables.4 
A further innovation is found in the separate assessment of adults and juveniles, for whom the 
general penal code and juvenile penal code are respectively relevant. Unlike the U.S. law, in 
Germany turning 18 does not automatically lead to the application of the adult penal law. 
Young adults (18 to under 21 years of age) might likewise be treated as juveniles (14 to 18 
                                                 
 
4 With the exception of Wolpin (1978, 1980), articles collected in Ehrlich and Liu (2006) that provide 
econometric tests of the economics of crime model are based on at most two of all three potential stages of 
deterrence: See, for instance, the papers by Ehrlich (1973, probability of apprehension and imprisonment, time 
served), Levitt (1997, police only) or Corman and Mocan (2000, police officers, arrest rates). Only papers 
dealing with capital crimes distinguish between different court decisions (see e.g. Ehrlich, 1975: execution 
versus time served). Witte (1980) in her detailed empirical model based on individual data of post release 
activities of former inmates does dispose on the probability of arrest and she approximates probabilities of 
conviction given arrest and of prison given conviction from past records of the individual.  
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years old). Whether adolescents were acting ‘… equal to a juvenile regarding moral and 
mental development at the time of the act’ in the sense of the Act on Juvenile Courts or not 
again depends on the discretionary margin of prosecutors and judges which varies between 
German states. Adequate treatment of juveniles and adolescents, in particular of those with a 
migration background, has been hotly debated in the recent state election campaign in Hesse 
in January 2008 after the president of cabinet council (Ministerpraesident), Roland Koch, 
called for tightening up the ruling German Juvenile Penal Code. In a recent paper, Lee and 
McCrary (2005) found evidence that young adults did not respond to the harsher adult law 
when turning 18, a result that contradicts Levitt’s (1998b) findings who showed that there is 
less crime when adolescents move into the adult system. 
Usually, empirical analyses of crime/deterrence take simultaneous account of only a fraction 
of the items detailed above. This article contributes to different strands of the existing 
literature:  
• First, as elaborated on in detail above, in the tradition of Ehrlich (1973), Wolpin 
(1978, 1980), Cornwell and Trumbull (1994), Levitt (1998), Corman and Mocan 
(2000), Fajnzylber et al. (2002), Mustard (2003), Lee and McCrary (2005) and others, 
the paper provides a comprehensive test of general deterrence based on panel data of 
all relevant stages of criminal prosecution, namely police, public prosecution, courts 
and sentencing, including informal sentences, probation and financial fines. 
• Second, the German Criminal Law Reform of 1969 and the federal autonomy of the 
German states provide an interesting natural experiment. Similar to Kessler and Piehl 
(1998) and Lacasse and Payne (1999), we are able to measure the degree of discretion 
in the criminal justice system and to study the impact of regional discretion on law 
enforcement and justice system outcomes. Unlike quoted studies, which analyze 
explanatory factors such as heterogeneity of social norms, we focus on the relative 
performance and the competition amongst coexisting criminal justice systems of 
federal states. 
Results presented in this article suggest that the criminal policy of diversion failed as 
increasing shares of discharges enhance crime rates in Germany, whereas crime is 
significantly deterred by higher clearance and conviction rates. Harshening the severity of 
sentences, however, does not provide a suitable strategy for fighting crime. The effects of 
indicators representing type (fine, probation, imprisonment) and severity (length of prison 
sentence, size of fine) of punishment are mostly small and insignificant.  
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 This paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 a model of diversion, custodial and non-
custodial sentencing is provided that analyses expected effects on crime in the conventional 
framework of economics of crime. Section 3 highlights descriptive evidence of trends and 
tendencies of crime as well as of prevailing heterogeneity of sentencing practices at the 
disaggregate state level in Germany. In Section 4 econometric results are presented. Section 5 
concludes.  
 
2. Theoretical Considerations: Diversion, Custodial and 
Non-Custodial Sentences in a Model of Crime   
 
In this chapter, we extend standard models of general deterrence (Becker 1968) by 
considering custodial and non-custodial sentences. The approach combines Wolpin’s (1978) 
idea of mapping the cascade police/public prosecution/court /sentencing decisions with a 
model of time allocation. Ehrlich (1973) introduced the framework of time allocation into the 
economics of crime. He considers an individual who allocates his fixed amount of time 
between legal and illegal income-generating activities. Under certain assumptions his main 
results are that a) given risk aversion, an increase in legal income opportunities reduces the 
incentive to participate in illegal activity, and b) increasing either the probability of detection 
and conviction or the punishment if convicted reduces the participation in illegal activities. 
Many authors (see, among others, Block and Heineke 1975, Witte 1980, Zhang 1997, 
Grogger 1998, and Funk 2004) have applied and extended the model, but also questioned 
some of Ehrlich’s general results. Block and Heineke (1975), in particular, attacked Ehrlich’s 
findings by showing that if the time allocated to legal and illegal activity is introduced into the 
utility function any comparative static result would be impossible without further 
assumptions. 
The following framework draws heavily upon the theoretical work of Ehrlich, Block and 
Heineke and Wolpin. We consider an individual who maximizes his expected utility E(U) by 
allocating available time T to legal ( tA ) and illegal ( it  ) activities, w.r.t. it t T+ <A  (non-
binding time constraint). The individual’s utility and well-being emerges from her time 
allocated to legal work resulting in legal income ( )L tA , and from his time spent on illegal 
activities rewarded by ( )iG t . Illegal activities are detected and punished with exogenously 
given probability p. We can decompose | |cl ac cl cv acp p p p≡ , where clp = probability of detection, 
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|ac clp = probability of trial if detected and |cv acp = probability of conviction if brought to court, 
i.e. p combines the discretionary work of police, it captures incentives from varying diversion 
policies (through decisions of public prosecution), and it covers the fact of a conviction 
(conditional on indictment), but does not include the sentence itself. This decomposition is of 
great importance for the econometric model (see below), where the respective individual roles 
of police, public prosecutors and judges need to be identified separately.5 In the present 
theoretical model, we restrain from splitting up the decision process into further ramifications 
such that it suffices to consider the overall effect of p.6  
As outlined in the Introduction, the main focus of this article is to contrast ‘tough’ 
(unconditional) prison sentences on the one hand, and more lenient sentencing practices, such 
as probation and fines, here covered as ‘non-custodial sentences’, as well as diversion on the 
other hand. Following this intention, we assume that the convicted offender expects the cost 
of a prison sentence ( )
iF t  with conditional probability |s cp and non-custodial sentences with 
probability |(1 )s cp− . Additionally, in case of the juvenile penal code, non-custodial 
sentencing would imply educational and correctional measures (see Sections 3 and 4). In the 
case of non-custodial sentences, offenders can still work in the legal sector, but their income 
after conviction, ( )bL tA , will fall below ( )L t A  as a consequence of the criminal record. This 
situation contrasts with the case of diversion: Despite previous detection, crime suspects are 
protected from any stigmatizing effect such that their potential legal and illegal earnings 
coincide with that of undetected criminals or legally working full-time employees individuals 
who all earn ( )L t A  and ( )iG t . This situation arises with probability (1 )p− .   
Summing up, three different situations need to be considered. First, in case of non-detection, 
pre-trial diversion or court’s dismissal, individual utility would be  
(2.1)    ( ) ( )[ ]iU A L t G t+ +A , 
emerging with probability (1-p). If detected, brought to court and convicted, either utility  
                                                 
 
5 In the econometric model, p will be decomposed into clp  (measured as clearance rate) and 
| |ac cl cv acp p (‘sentencing rate’). The reason why we construct a product instead of using all variables separately is 
the rather small variance of the share of acquittals, |cv acp  at the court level. 
6 The presented model could be extended by separate treatment of all three different stages | |cl ac cl cv acp p p p≡ of 
general deterrence, but expected effects of  p are identical to that of all factors underlying p unless standard 
assumptions (e.g. with respect to different legal or illegal payoffs at subsequent stages) would be changed. 
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(2.2)   ( ) ( )[ ]ibU A L t G t+ +A  
occurs in case of non-custodial sentences with probability |(1 )s cp p− , or  
 (2.3)   ( ) ( )[ ]i iU A G t F t+ −  
would apply with probability |s cpp , where U is individual’s utility function, and  
( )L tA   = legal income,       
( )bL tA  = legal income after previous conviction (adjusted for non-custodial  
   sentences such as fines),  with ( ) ( ) 0bL t L t> >A A , 
( )iG t  = illegal gain, 
( )iF t   = cost function (monetary equivalent) of prison sentence, 
A  =  initial wealth. 
 
Equations (2.1) to (2.3) provide standard assumptions in models of economics of crime, 
except for the explicit consideration of legal income with and without previous conviction. It 
should be reminded that the idea of the German Criminal Law Reform was to avoid any 
criminal record, or, if conviction still seemed justified, to avoid imprisonment. The rationale 
behind this legal norm is that offenders, in particular young offenders, should not lose their 
future legal income opportunities, because this would increase the risk of recidivism. 
Moreover, if convicted, any term behind bars would accumulate criminal capital (see 
evidence for this hypothesis by Bayer, Hjalmarsson and Pozen 2007, and Chen and Shapiro 
2003) and should be the ultima ratio of penal law (covered by equation (2.3)). Non-custodial 
sentences prevent negative experiences behind bars and enable convicted offenders to work in 
the legal sector, although previous records and fines cause an income gap such that expected 
payoffs are below those without conviction (see equation (2.2)). The difference 
( ) ( )bL t L t−A A can be interpreted as the stigma effect from previous convictions (Rasmussen 
1996, Funk 2004), and the result of fines. 
Individuals maximise expected utility, i.e  
(2.4)  ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]{ }| |(1 ) bs c s ci i iE U p p U A L t G t p U A G t F t= − + + + + −A  
                    ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1 ip U A L t G t+ − + +A , 
subject to the given time constraint. Unambiguous first-order conditions (see Appendix) 
require some further assumptions: 
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I. 0U ′′ <   risk aversion, 
II. ( ) 0iG t′′ <   decreasing marginal return to illegal activity, 
III. ( ) 0iF t >′′   neoclassic functional form of sentencing costs, 
IV. ( ) ( )i iF t G t′ ′>   ‘evil of punishment’  >  ‘gain from offence’.7 
Under these conditions, first-order conditions of an interior maximum provide the following 
results: 
(2.5)  0it
p
∂ <∂ ,     
|
0i
s c
t
p
∂ <∂ , 
|
0
(1 )
i
s c
t
p
∂ >∂ − ,  0
it
F
∂ <∂  , ( ) ( )( ) 0i b
t
L t L t
∂ <∂ −A A
. 
Thus, in addition to classical results confirming the crime reducing effects of probability (p) 
and severity (F) of punishment, our results highlight the crime rising effect of non-custodial 
sentences, i.e. increasing incentives to allocate time to illegal activities, when courts change 
their judgment preferences towards probation and financial punishments. Since p includes the 
probability of trial if detected, |ac clp , p is also driven by diversion. Hence the model predicts 
that more time is devoted to illegal activity when diversion is intensified through a rising 
share of crime suspects dismissed by public prosecutors (i.e. by falling indictment rates 
|ac clp ). 
Finally, the higher the stigma from a previous conviction, the higher is the effect of 
deterrence:8  
(2.6)     ( ) ( )( )
/
0
b
i
L t L t
t p
∂ −
∂ ∂ >
A A
. 
This effect is also called ‘dynamic deterrence’ in the literature because the threat of future 
income losses due to stigma would deter crime today (see Imai and Krishna, 2004).  
                                                 
 
7 This condition can be justified by Bentham’s (1781) ‘Principles of Morals and Legislation’. According to Rule 
1 of his ‘Of the Proportion between Punishments and Offences’ The value of the punishment must not be less in 
any case than what is sufficient to outweigh that of the profit of the offence (p.141). Moreover, Rule 7 states To 
enable the value of the punishment to outweigh that of the profit of the offence, it must be increased, in point of 
magnitude, in proportion as it falls short in point of certainty (p.143/144). 
8 Funk (2004), however, shows that while stigma deters unconvicted individuals from committing crimes, it may 
have undesirable side effects because it simultaneously enhances recidivism of a convicted and already 
stigmatized offender. 
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Summing up, derived signs are consistent with expected effects of rational choice theory. 
However, as was stated by Block and Heineke (1975), the signing of variables is not merely a 
theoretical question but demands econometric tests. They are going to be provided in Section 
4 of this article. 
 
3. Data and Descriptive Evidence 
3.1 Crime Trends in Germany, 1963 - 2005 
 
Germany is a federal republic consisting of 16 states (Laender), five of which represent East 
Germany, i.e. the former German Democratic Republic (GDR). General trends and tendencies 
have to rely on official statistics of recorded crime, collected by the Federal Criminal Police 
Office (Bundeskriminalamt), as Germany neither participates in the regular International 
Crime Victim Survey (ICVS) nor performs any periodical national crime victim survey.  
Notwithstanding well-known limitations of official crime statistics, in the following long-run 
trends are presented which focus on theft and violent crimes (mainly assaults). Figure 1 shows 
the long-run development of theft rates (serious theft and petty theft) in Germany. West 
German crime rates increased from 1,638 cases per 100,000 inhabitants in 1963 to 4,860 in 
1992 and fell thereafter to 3,287 in 2005.  East German rates started at a much higher level 
(6,591 in 1993), but are converging towards western rates ever since then.9  
[Figure1, Figure 2 about here] 
With the exception of a slight decline at the beginning of the 1980s, Figure 2 reveals a steady 
upward trend of violent crimes.10 A closer look at the data shows that robbery and assault 
rates are the driving forces behind this trend, whereas murder/manslaughter and rape stay 
relatively stable over time. Contrary to popular beliefs, violent crime rates in the East are not 
higher than in the West, there rather is divergence with stable crime levels in the East but 
strongly rising rates in the 1990s reaching 267 cases per 100,000 in Western Germany in 
2005.   
 
                                                 
 
9 There are no reliable crime statistics for the first three years after the fall of the Berlin Wall in 1990. 
10 Violent crime is measured as the sum of murder, manslaughter, rape, robbery, and assault, of which assault 
accounts for 69.5% and robbery for 25.5% in 2005. Note that robbery is registered as violent crime by official 
statistics, though its motivation suggests classifying it among property crimes (as we do in Section 4). 
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3.2. Criminal Prosecution in Germany: Data and General 
Tendencies 
 
In order to quantitatively operationalize the criminal prosecution process, data from two 
sources of official statistics is drawn upon – police crime statistics (PCS) and criminal 
prosecution statistics (StVStat). Information was acquired for six ‘classic’ categories of crime 
(murder and manslaughter, rape and indecent assault, robbery, aggravated assault, serious 
theft, petty theft) for each of the former West German states for the period from 1977 - 2001. 
The criminal prosecution process should be covered as comprehensively as possible. To 
accomplish this goal, two issues require further attention. First, it must be borne in mind that 
the general penal code and the juvenile penal code differ fundamentally with respect to their 
provisions for the type of sanction and intensity of invasiveness. Second, when inspecting 
long-run efficiency of police, prosecutors and courts, demographic changes of the criminal 
population have to be taken into account.11   
The juvenile penal code makes frequent use of two forms of punishment not provided for in 
the general penal code, corrective penalties (educational aid and supervision, issuing of 
instructions) and disciplinary measures (mandatory labor service, juvenile detention). 
Furthermore, sentences pronounced according to the juvenile penal code are principally less 
severe, this being reflected in the fact that, for example, the longest sentence is only half as 
long as that provided for by the general penal code and that no juvenile sentence (not even for 
murder) exceeds 10 years. In the context of these differences, it seems reasonable to develop 
separate systems of prosecution indicators for adults and juveniles and to then correlate them 
within the context of separate estimation models with suitable, i.e. age-specific,12 incidences 
of crime. Accordingly, one model refers to persons aged 14 to 17 years. The latter are 
sentenced exclusively according to the juvenile penal code. The other model is conceived for 
                                                 
 
11 Note that in Germany the ratio of the young population under 20 years of age to the population between 20 to 
under 65 years decreased from 0.53 in 1970 to 0.33 in 2005, whereas during the same time period the ratio of the 
population elder than 65 years to the active population aged 20 to 64 years increased from 0.25 to 0.32 (Source: 
Statistisches Bundesamt 2006). Thus, ignoring the decreasing share of crime-prone aged people would lead to a 
downward bias of crime rates of the active and, in particular, of the young population.   
12 Age-specific crime rates are not available and have to be approximated under the assumption that the 
(unknown) age distribution of criminals is similar to the (known) age distribution of suspects. The approximation 
is conducted according to the formula, ( / ) (1/ ) 100.000cast cst cast cst astO CASES SP SP PS= × × × , where CASES represents 
the number of cases recorded by police, SP the number of crime suspects, and PS the size of population. The 
indices identify the offence group (c), the age group (a), the federal state (s) and the year (t).  
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persons aged 21 to 59 years, who are exclusively subject to the general penal code.13 
Adolescents (persons aged 18 to 20 years) are excluded from the empirical analysis as it is at 
the discretion of the judge whether they are sentenced according to either the juvenile penal 
code or the general penal code, a circumstance which prevents econometric testing of any 
penal system for this age group. Table 1 (see below) reveals that at the end of the period under 
investigation (1998-2001) only about one tenth of all convicted violent adolescents were 
sentenced under the adult penal law. This rate was still 29.7% in 1977/81 for aggravated 
assault, which highlights the still ongoing realization of the ideas of German Criminal Law 
Reform in 1969, according to which young offenders should not be punished but rather 
educated.  
As a rule, the criminal prosecution process begins with investigative police work following 
the registration of a criminal offence, and ends, if successful, with the crime being solved. The 
initial indicator of the prosecution system is, therefore, the clearance rate (Table 1, column 
(1)), which links the number of crimes registered to the number of cases solved and thus is 
based solely on data from the PCS. As regards the clearance rate, no age-specific 
differentiation is possible since, in the case of crimes which are registered but not solved, it 
cannot be ascertained by whom the crime was committed. For the sake of simplicity it is 
assumed that the (unknown) clearance rates for both juveniles and adults correspond to the 
general clearance rate and thus they are equally high. Table 1 presents general tendencies of 
two important and characteristic types of crime in Germany, namely serious theft and 
aggravated assault. It reveals high and quite stable clearance rates for assault (about 85%), 
and much smaller rates for serious theft which declined from 19.3% in 1977-81 down to 
13.3% in 1998-2001.   
[Table 1 about here] 
When a crime is solved by the police, i.e. when a suspect is, or suspects are, detected, it then 
becomes the task of the public prosecutor’s office to legally and factually evaluate the 
accusation and to reach a final decision regarding the investigative procedure. Essentially, the 
latter can result in the case being dropped owing to the uncertain probability of sentencing, in 
diversion or in an indictment (BMI and BMJ, 2001, pp. 344, 347). In the case of an 
indictment the suspect is subject to sentencing by a court. In Table 1, column (2), the share of 
                                                 
 
13 As already pointed out above, the intention is to adjust for demographic changes and to focus on persons in the 
’criminally active’ age group (according to BKA, 2004, in 2003 only 6.3% of suspects were 60 years or older, 
while 21 and 22-year-olds made up 6.4% of all suspects). 
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cases passed on to court is referred to as the indictment rate. The large drop in criminal 
proceedings reflects the highly influential discretionary power of the public prosecutor. 
During the last period of investigation, 1998 – 2001, only 35.4% of suspects of serious theft 
and 30.4% of assaults were brought to court. Both rates fell throughout the period of 
investigation, in particular during the 1980s. They came down from 46.5% to 35.4% for theft 
(average rates of the period 19771981 compared to the period 1998/2001) and from 35.1 to 
30.4% for assault. Put differently, in the most recent period of the sample, almost 70% of 
police clear-ups are discharged by public prosecutors through the channel of pre-trial 
diversion.   
The trial can result in acquittal, in the proceedings being dismissed or end in a conviction. In 
contrast to the indictment rate, the proportion of trials resulting in a conviction, i.e. the 
conviction rate, remained rather stable, as can be seen from the examples of theft and assault 
in Table 1, column (3). The ratio of acquittals and dismissals based on trials in case of serious 
assault, however, significantly exceeds that of serious theft (37% versus 17%, on average).  
Considering the variations and interactions of both indictment and conviction rate, of course, 
suggests drawing on the product of both variables, henceforth defined as the sentencing rate, 
whereby its operationalization can be conducted separately for adults and juveniles, owing to 
the availability of age-specific data on suspects in the PCS and on convicted persons in the 
StVStat.14 Thus the econometric analysis below will make use of the sentencing rate rather 
than considering separate indictment and conviction rates, having in mind that the variance of 
the sentencing rate is mainly driven by public prosecution activities over time and across 
states (see also below).  
In as far as a sentence is passed, the judge’s verdict can, according to the adult penal code, 
take the form of either a non-suspended prison sentence, a suspended prison sentence – i.e. 
one which is suspended on probation – or a fine. The attendant indicators are the 
imprisonment rate, probation rate and fine rate (Table 1, columns (4) to (6)). The juvenile 
penal code also provides for non-suspended and suspended prison sentences. Additionally, 
two alternative punitive means, disciplinary measures and corrective measures, are available. 
For the various forms of punishment the severity of the penalty is measured by the length of 
                                                 
 
14 The fact that the computation of the sentencing rate (and of all subsequent indicators) necessitates the 
(painstaking) match of information from the PCS with that of StVStat is evidently the reason why studies on 
crime and deterrence in Germany (see Curti 1999, Büttner and Spengler 2002, Entorf and Spengler 2000, 2002, 
Entorf and Winker 2008) are almost without exception restricted to information from the PCS. 
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the non-suspended prison sentence handed down and by the number of per-diem fines, 
respectively. The prosecution indicators developed here (besides the other variables used in 
the empirical analysis) will subsequently be related to the incidence of crime using panel-
econometric procedures.  
Table 1 reveals unclear trends of the imprisonment rate. Proportions were low and stable at 
about 10% for aggravated assault and decreasing for serious theft from 41.1% down to 31.6% 
during the 1980s and early 1990s, indicating that incarceration was driven back in favor of 
probation and financial fines, as suggested by the reform of 1969. However, from 1998 on 
imprisonment (from 10.4% up to 14.7%) and probation rates (from 29.2% up to 49.7%) for 
aggravated assault rose sharply, while the fine rate dropped from 60.4% down to 35.5%. This 
somewhat more punitive behavior from the late 1990s on is the result of a 1998 reform of the 
reform of 1969 (see Busch, 2005, for the history of all reforms since the Grand Criminal Law 
Reform of 1969). This reform (6th Strafrechtsreformgesetz) is the legislative outcome of 
preceding discussions on the inconsistency of existing sentences and degrees of penalties with 
the Werteordnung (value system) of the German Constitution. The debate was raised because 
sentences for violent crimes appeared to be unjustifiably lenient compared to sentences for 
property crimes. As a consequence, in a reform of the Grand Reform new (more severe) 
maximum and minimum penalties were introduced for many violent crimes (for example: the 
minimum/ maximum penalty for aggravated assault was 3 months/ 5 years before the reform, 
and it is 6 months/ 10 years after the reform). 
Summing up, the major issue of the sentencing practice is the tendency towards lower 
indictment rates (see Table 1, column 2) and higher rates of probation15 (see Table 1, column 
5). Both trends are in line with the idea of the German Criminal Law Reform of 1969 and 
confirm general observations on the increasing importance of diversion and sentences 
suspended on probation found elsewhere (see, in particular, Heinz 2006).  
 
3.3. Heterogeneity of Criminal Policy at the State Level  
Identification of deterrent effects by means of multivariate panel econometrics is only 
possible when both the explanatory and the dependent variables display a sufficiently strong 
                                                 
 
15 The share of sentences on probation in the sum of both conditional and unconditional imprisonment increased 
from 48.2% in 1977/81 to 53.9% in 1997/2001 for theft and even from 67.4% to 77.1% for aggravated assault. 
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variation. In Figures 3 to 5 federal-state-specific time series for serious theft by adults are 
presented for purposes of exemplification.16 Largely congruent temporal developments (a rise 
in serious theft up to the mid-1990s, followed by a decrease) can be identified for three groups 
of states in Figure 3. The first group consists of so-called city-states, Bremen (Bre) and 
Hamburg (Ham), with crime rates many times as high as these in the non-city states.17 The 
second one is made up of Baden-Wurttemberg (BaW), Bavaria (Bav), Rhineland-Palatinate 
(RhP) and Saarland (Saa). These states exhibit a below-average occurrence of crime in 
comparison with the Federation (the former West German states except Berlin). All remaining 
states, i.e Hesse (Hes), Lower Saxony (LoS), North Rhine-Westphalia (NoW) and Schleswig-
Holstein (SHo), can be allocated to a third group, which lies above the federal average.  
[Figures 3 to 5 about here] 
Figures 4 and 5 reveal the heterogeneous development of deterrence indicators at the state 
level. For reasons of layout and space, the presentation is limited to Bavaria, Bremen and 
Schleswig-Holstein as representatives of the state-groups specified above. Fig. 4 shows that, 
in the federal comparison, Bavaria has the highest clearance-rate, the latter finally lying 
considerably above the federal average which decreased over time. The temporal variation is 
to be seen most clearly in the case of Bremen, where the clearance-rate fell from 16% in 1980 
to the present figure of 6%. As can be gathered from Figure 5, crime suspects in Bavaria are 
convicted and sentenced with above-average frequency (at least in recent years). Moreover, 
Bavaria is proving to be largely resistant to the long-term federal trend towards diversion. 
Despite the federally binding penal code, Bavaria also follows a harsher course concerning 
type and severity of sentence, non-suspended prison sentences for adults being markedly more 
frequent than in the federal average, notwithstanding recent years, and of a longer duration.  
Among the non-city states, Schleswig-Holstein can be considered a representative of a more 
lenient criminal policy. The state’s administration of justice repeatedly avowed its persuasion 
that alternative sentencing practices and diversion are effective measures that prevent crime 
through avoidance of formal convictions.18 The different notions of adequate strategies for 
fighting crime in both states can be seen by significantly higher imprisonment rates in Bavaria 
                                                 
 
16 Serious theft was selected because it is a crime category clearly related to material gain and is, therefore, 
especially compatible with the economic theory of crime and is, moreover, the crime category with the highest 
incidence.  
17 Berlin, which also belongs to the group of city-states, is excluded from the (descriptive and multivariate) 
analysis because of the structural upheavals connected with German Reunification.  
18 In 1990, the state passed a bill that renewed and extended the idea of the federal reform of 1969. 
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and in particular by the strongly divergent length of imprisonment throughout the 1990s, 
indicating strong compliance with the Criminal Law Reform of 1969 in Schleswig-Holstein 
and less or no compliance in Bavaria.  
Table 2 focuses on the discrepancies between the two states. As regards the role of the public 
prosecutor, the most remarkable differences can be detected for assault and theft. Whereas 
sentencing rates for assault were about the same in both states and even higher for theft in 
Schleswig-Holstein than in Bavaria before 1990, the recent period shows a strongly reverted 
picture: The probability of ‘sentencing’ (i.e. conviction of a crime suspect) dropped from 
19.4% to 14.2% for aggravated assault (Bavaria: increase from 19.5% to 19.7%), from 46.4% 
to 26.4% for petty theft (Bavaria: increase from 37.% to 38.1%) and from 43.5% to 27% for 
serious theft (Bavaria: decrease from 35.9% to 31.6%). During the period 1991-2001, all 
average sentencing rates of the Bavarian justice exceeded those of Schleswig-Holstein. While 
these differences are mainly caused by the discretionary power of public prosecutors, also 
judges act according to respective state-specific judiciary norms. With the exception of 
murder, Bavarian courts impose unconditional prison sentences more often than courts in the 
northern state Schleswig-Holstein, where judges have the strong propensity to divert 
defendants from custody. Some of these contrasts are quite remarkable. In Bavaria, for 
instance, robbers receive a prison term in 64.2 cases out of 100 convictions in Bavaria, but in 
Schleswig Holstein this is becomes evident in 48 cases.  
[Table 2 about here] 
Given precedent probabilities of sentencing and imprisonment, it is not surprising that also 
expected values of the expected length of imprisonment differ substantially. In Table 2, the 
expected duration is defined as the product of the clearance rate, sentencing rate, 
imprisonment rate and the average (realized) length of the prison sentence. In Bavaria 
offenders of all types of crime have to expect longer prison terms than in Schleswig-Holstein. 
After 1990, albeit at a low level, most expected durations in Bavarian prisons are more than 
twice the Schleswig-Holstein value. Given that all crimes were reported to the police, in 
Schleswig-Holstein robbers would take the risk of 2.4 months in custody (compared to 4.9 
months in Bavaria), committing rape and sexual assault would imply the risk of 3.1 months 
(5.7 months in Bavaria), aggravated assault would cause just 6 days in prison (12 days in 
Bavaria), and the expected prison sentences for serious theft and petty theft were 4 days and 
0.6 days (12 days and 2.4 days), respectively. 
 [Table 3 about here] 
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Table 3 summarizes previous findings by way of relating crime rates to indicators of 
deterrence. The table depicts results from simple panel regressions of crime rates on the 
probability of being sentenced to imprisonment (without probation) conditional upon 
detection arrest (i.e. the product of sentencing and imprisonment rates). These preliminary 
econometric results (without any further explanatory variables except control for state and 
year effects) give an impression of the overall (combined) effect of public prosecutors and 
courts on crime rates. Almost without exceptions all coefficients have a negative (and 
significant) sign, as expected from deterrence theory. The only exceptions are rape and 
aggravated assault for the less efficient and problematic time series evidence in column (1), 
and for assault in a panel regression with time and state effects (col. (4)). Inspecting most 
reliable estimations in cols. (4) and (5), which both control for unobserved heterogeneity by 
either including time and state effects or by taking growth rates of dependent and explanatory 
variables, strongest effects from harsher conviction and/or sentencing seem to arise for theft 
and, somewhat surprisingly, because it contradicts the popular view that deterrence does less 
apply to violence crime, for murder and manslaughter. The next section will show whether 
these preliminary findings will hold in a more general and statistically more elaborated 
context. In particular, from Table 3 it seems obvious that deterrence might work, but the 
causes of its significance cannot be identified. Hence, the question still to be answered is 
whether diversion decisions by public prosecutors have a stronger impact than court decisions 
regarding type and severity, or vice versa, or whether both are likewise important.   
 
4. Econometric Evidence 
4.1. Econometric Modeling and Methodological Aspects 
 
The econometric model is based on the theoretical framework on informal, custodial and non-
custodial sentencing derived in Section 2, eventually leading to an augmented version of  the 
traditional supply of offences (Becker 1968, Ehrlich 1973):  
(4.1)    ( ) ( )
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| |
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 , 
where p is factorized into clp  (clearance rate) and | |ac cl cv acp p (sentencing rate). 
Previous descriptive evidence has revealed that criminal prosecution indicators display a high 
variation both across the federal states and throughout the observation period, and show a 
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certain (inverse) correlation with the incidences of crime. The crime rate will be subsequently 
related to all criminal prosecution indicators described above and to further explanatory 
variables derived from the economic theory of crime. The latter consist of the real per-capita 
gross domestic product, the unemployment rate and the share of migrants19, representing legal 
and illegal income opportunities (cf. Ehrlich, 1973, for theoretical grounding, and, for 
example, Entorf and Spengler, 2002, for a survey of empirical results). Descriptive statistics 
of all variables are included in Tables A1 and A2 (Appendix).  
Results by Cornwell and Trumbull (1994) reveal that disregarding unobserved heterogeneity 
would lead to substantial overestimation of deterrence effects. Sources of such biases can be 
seen, for example, in the basic attitude of the state population towards illegal acts, in the 
peculiarities of the state prosecution systems which are not accounted for by the prosecution 
indicators deployed, especially in varying levels of underreporting, or in changes of the 
measurement of the endogenous variable such as changing definitions of and allocations to 
crime categories. The panel structure of the used data set implies that unobserved 
heterogeneity of the federal states can be controlled for in the estimations. In estimation 
terms, besides applying a (two-way) fixed-effect model (i.e. with state-specific as well as 
time-specific constants as additional regressors), unobserved heterogeneity is accounted for 
by means of a framework into which first differences of all variables are incorporated. The 
fixed-effects model is deployed in two variants. In the first version, the explanatory variables 
enter the equation with their contemporaneous values, whereas in the second one they are 
lagged by one period. This procedure takes account of the fact that there is a lack of 
knowledge as to how quickly changes to the criminal prosecution system and other variables 
are perceived by potential offenders and relevant to their decision-making. 
A total of 36 (6 offence groups x 2 age groups x 3 model specifications) estimations were 
conducted. The general estimation equation for the fixed-effects model with contemporaneous 
explanatory variables (Model 1) can be written as follows,  
 (4.2)   ( 1)ln( ) ln( )st s t st s t stO Oβ µ λ ε−= + + + +X Γ  
where the indices s and t stand for federal states and time, respectively, ln refers to the natural 
logarithm, O  stands for the crime rate, X  represents a k×1  vector of explanatory variables 
which, besides containing the criminal prosecution indicators, also depicts the three control 
                                                 
 
19 The German PCS does not distinguish between migrants with and without German citizenship. For this reason 
‘migrants’ cover the share of foreign nationals in the German resident population.  
 19
variables mentioned above, and with the variables µ  and λ  embodying state-specific (fixed-
effects) constants and indicator variables of annual shifts (‘time dummies’). The coefficients 
which are to be estimated are represented by β  and the 1×k coefficient vector Γ . Through 
incorporation of the lagged crime rate, ( 1)s tO − , as additional regressor, the model is also 
suitable for the depiction of possible dynamic structures of crime incidence. Note that the 
specification of equation (4.2) includes the complete cascade of deterrence, i.e. of police, 
public prosecution, court decision and kind of imprisonment. This comprehensive coverage 
avoids any misspecification due to missing variables, a problem put forward by Mendes and 
McDonald (2001), and Mustard (2003). Conviction rates and time served are theoretically 
important, but rarely used. Mustard (2003) shows that omitting them would cause an 
underestimation of the effect of the arrest rate by as much as 50% because of the negative 
correlation of these two variables with the arrest rate.   
Model 2 (the fixed-effects model with lagged explanatory variables) can be derived from 
Model 1 by replacing stX  with )1( −tsX  in the above equation. Model 3 can be derived from 
Model 1 by formation of first differences, and is transformed as follows: 
 (4.3)   ln( )st st t stO α λ ε∆ = + + +X Γ 20 
The large and, in comparison with the cross-sectional dimension, dominant time-series 
dimension of the data set used (T=25, N=10) suggests consideration of time-series-specific 
problems such as integration, co-integration and serial correlation. Integrated and non-
stationary time-series possess a high degree of persistence which does not, per se, represent a 
problem, but is frequently associated with a violation of the classical assumptions. Moreover, 
the time-series literature shows that when one integrated variable is regressed on another 
integrated variable this can lead to the problem of spurious regressions which also holds for 
fixed-effect models (Entorf 1997). Generally, the integration of time-series can be remedied 
by first differencing the data. Given that there is not only application of first differences but 
                                                 
 
20 The use of X  in place of X  denotes that levels (or logarithmic levels) of the explanatory variables are 
replaced by their first differences. Differencing of time dummies would imply that an annual effect in the change 
of the crime rate would be completely neutralised in the following year. Since this is not plausible, the 
differencing of time dummies was abandoned. α  represents a constant which cannot be taken into account in 
Models 1 and 2 due to the use of state-specific constants. A lagged endogenous variable is no longer present as 
regressor because, first, any economic or criminological motivation for the inter-temporal dependence of change 
rates of crime incidence is less apparent than in the case of levels. Second, a lagged endogenous variable in 
Model 3 would inevitably lead to inconsistent estimations. Although inconsistencies might occur in Models 1 
and 2, too, for large T they tend to be less important than in case of Model 3 (Wooldridge 2002).  
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also of fixed-effects models based on (logarithmic) levels, integration tests for panel data 
were conducted first.21  
The results (p-values) from four different panel integration tests according to Im, Pesaran and 
Shin (2003) are presented for all dependent variables (see Table A3). As expected, stationarity 
can be assumed for the variables in first differences. However, also most (logarithmic) levels 
of crime rates prove to be stationary. This applies especially to murder and manslaughter, in 
addition to rape and indecent assault. Moreover, all tests based on variant 1 of the IPS-test (no 
lags, no trend included) reject the null of non-stationarity. Indications of non-stationarity arise 
mainly for tests including a (rather unrealistic) trend (specifications 2 and 4). Tests for all 105 
explanatory variables are not detailed here for reasons of space. 22 In summary, it can be noted 
that for all variables in first differences and for 76 (i.e. for 72%) of all variables in levels non-
stationarity could be dispelled. The hypothesis of non-stationarity can not be rejected for the 
levels of the control variables per-capita GDP, unemployment rate and share of migrants. 
Bearing in mind the fact that the dependent variables in the analysis were more in keeping 
with I(0) than I(1) processes and most of the explanatory variables (especially the criminal 
prosecution indicators) are stationary, it does not, on the one hand, make sense to examine co-
integration relations while, on the other hand, the danger of producing nonsense regressions 
using fixed-effects estimations is quite marginal.  
A further problem of estimation with panel data – especially in the case of a larger time-series 
dimension – is frequently caused by the existence of serial correlation of residuals. Serial 
correlation is mainly a problem of regression in levels (and not in first differences) and might 
‘only’ cause misleading estimates of standard errors (a problem which is counteracted by 
calculating autocorrelation- and heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors), but can, however, 
also be an indication of a misspecification of the model and, correspondingly, of biased 
estimation of coefficients themselves. For instance, serial correlation might reflect a possible 
dynamic misspecification of the model which is often accounted for by inclusion of lagged 
endogenous variables as additional regressors. In the crime context, a factual justification of 
such an enhancement of the econometric model can be seen in the existence of recidivist 
                                                 
 
21 Integration tests for the complete panel have a higher statistical power than conventional unit root tests on 
individual time series of panel data sets. 
22 Results are available upon request. 
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offenders who, to the extent that they are not arrested and jailed, contribute not only to the 
crime rate of the current period but also of subsequent periods.23 
Thus, including lagged endogenous variables becomes primarily relevant for fixed-effects 
models. Nickell (1981), however, shows that using a lagged dependent variable as regressor 
in the fixed-effects model violates the Gauss-Markov Theorem and would lead to inconsistent 
parameter estimates. As the so-called Nickell bias has the order O(1/T ), its magnitude 
depends on the time-series dimension of used panel data. Judson and Owen (1999) show that 
the bias arising from the coefficient of the lagged endogenous variables in the LSDV (least 
squares dummy variable) model can, even at T=30, amount to 3-20% of the true value of the 
coefficient. Accordingly, they suggest the corrected LSDVC estimator based on Kiviet 
(1995), which, however, has not previously been applied to unbalanced panels and is 
correspondingly not utilized in the present study.24 For unbalanced panels from T=30 onwards 
Judson and Own recommend the use of the LSDV estimator, whereas for T=20 a GMM 
procedure according to Anderson and Hsiao (1981) and Arellano and Bond (1991) would be 
preferable. The reason for making use of the LSDV estimator (for T=25) in the following is 
twofold: Firstly, the bias caused by the LSDV estimators for the coefficients of the remaining 
(non-predetermined) explanatory variables are already negligibly low for T=20 (Judson and 
Owen 1999), meaning that problems should arise, if at all, only when the long-term effects 
(based on the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable) of criminal prosecution indicators 
are calculated. The latter, however, are, if anything, underestimated due to the negative bias of 
the (generally positive) coefficients of the lagged endogenous variables such that any 
reasoning based on significant variables would represent a conservative interpretation of the 
influence of criminal prosecution on crime.  
Potential simultaneity between the crime rate and explanatory factors of deterrence might 
require the use of instrument variable estimators (IV estimators). When the incidence of crime 
is not only influenced by the clearance rate but also vice versa, estimates which do not 
account for the endogeneity of explanatory variables might lead to inconsistency problems. 
                                                 
 
23 However, given that German imprisonment rates amount to almost only one tenth of US imprisonment rates, 
the analysis does not explicitly adjust deterrence estimates for potential incapacitation effects, as many studies 
based on US crime data do. It is thus assumed that the pool of potential criminals is sufficiently large and not 
significantly reduced by imprisonment, and that the rather small group of incapacitated offenders is easily 
substituted out of this pool.  
24 Gaps in data arise for the smaller federal states such as Bremen in the time-series of the logarithmic crime 
rates and criminal prosecution indicators for low-incidence offences (e.g. murder) committed by juveniles. 
Moreover, following some communication with representatives of the German Statistical Office, we treated 
some few faulty data points as missing because of their evidently misrecorded entries. 
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There are several conceivable reasons for the interrelation of crime rate and clearance. The 
size of the clearance rate can be due to, for example, the overloading of police resulting from 
an unexpected rise in crime. Owing to the overloading of police capacity the clearance rate 
will sink, the absolute number of cases solved remaining constant. Since the crime rate rises 
simultaneously, the negative partial correlation between clearance rate and crime incidence 
would be overestimated in least-squares applications. This could be counter-balanced by a 
potential underestimation for at least two reasons. First, criminal policy would respond to 
increasing crime rates by allocating public resources to the police, resulting in higher 
clearance rates. A second reason is related to the share of undocumented crimes in the true 
number of crimes which likewise depends on police resources, in particular for offence types 
revealed by monitoring/controls and/or random spot checks. Two thirds of petty thefts in 
Germany, for example, are cases of shoplifting (Bundeskriminalamt, 2004). As a rule, 
however, registered cases of shoplifting are characterised by an offender being caught red-
handed, the case being cleared immediately. If, ceteris paribus, the number of registered cases 
of shoplifting were now to increase through an increase (decrease) in controls, the petty-theft 
rate would then rise (fall) with simultaneously increasing (decreasing) specific clearance rate. 
This apparently positive correlation between crime rate and clearance rate can lead to a state 
where a true deterrent effect is not only underestimated in econometric studies, but is possibly 
not verifiable and even produces an empirical result which is the exact opposite. Against this 
background, IV estimations are conducted with the goal of neutralising possible simultaneity 
relationships between crime rate and clearance rate.25  
The successful application of IV estimations crucially depends upon the existence of adequate 
instrument variables which are correlated with the endogenous explanatory variables while 
being simultaneously uncorrelated with the error term. In the following, the offence-specific 
attempt ratios (i.e. the ratio of non-completed offences of all registered offences in an offence 
group) and indicators of the crime-scene distribution classed according to size of municipality 
(cf. Table 1) are used as potential instrument variables. This seems to be a reasonable choice 
since, firstly, an influence on the clearance rate is to be expected from both variables. Ceteris 
paribus, (merely) attempted offences ought to result in less thorough police investigative 
efforts than completed offences and detective work in an urban environment should prove to 
be more difficult than in rural areas. Secondly, it may be reasonably assumed that the ratio of 
                                                 
 
25 Simultaneities between the crime rate and other criminal prosecution indicators are also conceivable. As these 
are less apparent than in the case of the clearance rate, however, they remain unaccounted for.  
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attempts and the regional crime-scene distribution cannot be considered prime determinants of 
crime which should be incorporated into equations (4.2) and (4.3). These variables emerge ex 
post from the realisation of illegal activities and have no theoretical correspondence in the 
econometric crime model.26 
 
4.2. Estimation results  
Linking econometric results with the descriptive evidence presented above, Tables 4 and 5 
first focus on serious theft and aggravated assault representing important types of property 
crimes and violent crimes, respectively.27 A short summary of included explanatory 
deterrence indicators is reviewed for the sake of convenience (for details see Section 3): 
a) General Penal Code / Adults (persons aged from 21 to under 60 years) 
• Clearance rate  = total cleared cases / total registered cases 
• Sentencing  rate  = persons indicted and convicted / suspects, aged 21 to under 60 years 
• Imprisonment rate = persons sentenced to non-suspended imprisonment / persons sentenced,  
    aged 21 to under 60 years 
• Probation rate =   persons sentenced to suspended imprisonment / persons sentenced, aged   
    21 to under 60 years 
• Fine rate =   persons sentenced to fine (as most severe sentence) / persons sentenced,  
aged 21 to under 60 years 
• Average length (in months) of non-suspended prison sentence of persons sentenced aged from 21 to 
under 60 years 
• Average number of per-diem fines [if fine is most severe sentence] of persons sentenced  21 to under 60 
years 
 
b) Juvenile Penal Code / Juveniles (persons aged from14 to under 18 years) 
• Clearance rate (see above) 
• Sentencing rate =   persons indicted and convicted / suspects, aged from 14 to under 18 years 
• Imprisonment rate = persons sentenced to non-suspended imprisonment / persons sentenced,  
    aged 14 to under 18 years 
• Probation rate =   persons sentenced to suspended imprisonment / persons sentenced, aged 14  
    to under 18  years 
                                                 
 
26 Other variables with potential relevance to the instrumentation for the clearance rate are public debt and 
electoral cycles, as proposed by Levitt (1997). However, both variables prove to be weak or wholly irrelevant 
instruments and must therefore be excluded from further analysis in order to avoid (serious) distortions of the 
estimate coefficients (cf. Bound, Jaeger and Baker 1995 and Staiger and Stock 1997 on the weak-instrument 
problem).  
27 The Stata module ivreg2 by Baum, Schaffer and Stillman (2002) was used for all estimations, which offers 
not only various IV estimators but also enables the calculation of heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust 
standard errors. 
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• Rate of disciplinary and corrective measures = sentenced to disciplinary or corrective measures (as 
most severe sentence) / persons sentenced, aged from 14 to under 18 years 
• Average length (in months) of non-suspended prison sentence of sentenced persons aged from 14 to 
under 18 years 
 
Table 4 reveals that the clearance and sentencing rate prove to be the most important crime-
reducing factors. These indicators display highly significant estimates across all three model 
specifications. While the effect magnitudes for Model 3 are immediately evident from the 
table (the semi-log specification implies that an increase of one percentage point in the 
clearance rate, for example, leads to a decrease of 1.5 percent in serious theft), in the case of 
Models 1 and 2 there is need of a differentiation between (reported) short and long-term 
effects (or short and long-term semi-elasticities). The latter are obtained by assuming a long-
term equilibrium of the crime rate (Ot=Ot-1). The long-term effect of the clearance rate in 
Model 1 is, for example, –2.623 (= -1.322 / (1 – 0.4960)).  
In none of the cases do the remaining criminal prosecution indicators display significant 
coefficients across all three models. If, however, significant results are reported, they are in 
accordance with the deterrence hypothesis. Increasing rates of probation (relative to 
incarceration), for instance, seem to have a crime enhancing effect as suggested by the 
theoretical model, although significance (at the 5% level) can only be reported for one out of 
6 cases (adults, Model 1).28 The large and positive coefficients on the rate of disciplinary and 
correctional measures (Models 1 and 3) indicate that juveniles do not adequately respond to 
the idea of the Juvenile Penal Law, according to which young offenders needed to be 
educated, not punished (Heinz 2006). On the contrary, intensified application of such 
measures instead of imprisonment would be associated with increasing crime rates. 
Harshening punishment, however, does not prove to be a promising alternative either, as the 
length of time served turns out to be insignificant. Thus, our econometric results imply that 
serious theft by juveniles could be cut back by a more rigorous enforcement of the existing 
juvenile penal law. This includes conviction (instead of dismissal and dropping cases by 
public prosecutors and judges) and sentencing to juvenile custody (instead of educational 
measures and probation), but does not include longer prison terms. 
Legal income opportunities seem to be better covered by the potential risk of unemployment 
than by GDP per capita as the latter shows ambiguous signs of influence and just one 
                                                 
 
28 Note that there are three types of sentences adding up to unity. As we are mainly interested in the effect 
relative to unconditional imprisonment, we employ the latter as reference category.  
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(negative) significant estimated coefficient (adults, Model 1). The positive coefficients of the 
unemployment rate throughout all specifications confirm previous results found in the 
literature indicating that poorer prospects of employment lead to an increase in property 
crimes (see, e.g., Raphael and Winter-Ebmer 2001, Lin 2008). This conclusion can be 
confirmed by the results for petty theft (see Table A7, Appendix). Contrary to popular belief, 
the share of migrants does not have any significant effect on serious theft.  
There is no instrumentation of the clearance rate for serious theft. To the extent that the 
instruments proved to be relevant indicated by testing the exclusion restriction (each in Model 
3), their exogeneity is discarded on the grounds of the test for overidentifying restrictions at 
the 10% (but not 5%) level. However, testing the endogeneity of the clearance rate revealed 
that instrumentation had to be abandoned since the hypothesis of exogenous clearance rates 
cannot be rejected (cf. p-values of endogeneity tests).29 The same holds for aggravated assault 
discussed below (see Table 5).  
[Tables 4 and 5 about here] 
The crime curbing effect of higher sentencing rates (i.e. indictment and conviction instead of 
diversion and dismissal) is confirmed for aggravated assaults. Only estimated coefficients of 
Model 2 (lagged explanatory variables) do not show any significance. Other results are less 
clear and partly contradict expectations derived from the traditional rational choice theory. 
While findings corroborate the crime-reducing effect of police activities (cf. clear-up rates) at 
least for juveniles, young violent offenders are not deterred by unconditional imprisonment. 
Instead, higher shares of convictions effecting imprisonment conditional on probation and 
disciplinary/correctional measures would scale back the number of aggravated assaults 
committed by juveniles back. Again, increasing the length of custody sentences does not have 
the expected effect of lowering crime. The sign is even positive and significant in one case 
(adults, Model 1) and insignificant in all remaining specifications. Financial fines do not play 
any significant role. 
The effect of unemployment on aggravated assault is less obvious than in the case of serious 
theft. While it is positive (although insignificant) for juveniles, it is negative and even 
significantly negative in the case of Model 1 for adults. Raphael and Winter-Ebmer (2001), 
who report similar experiences (i.e. negative signs) for the violent crimes ‘rape’ and ‘murder’, 
discuss potential reasons such as misspecification, but from presented results on ‘rape and 
                                                 
 
29 See notes at the bottom of Table 4 for more details on IV related tests. 
 26
indecent assault’, ‘murder/ manslaughter’and ‘robbery’ (see Tables A4 to A7, Appendix) it 
can be inferred that the negative effect measured on assault is rather an exception to otherwise 
crime enhancing effects of unemployment.  
Higher GDP p.c. does not seem to have any short-term effect (Model 3), but wealthier regions 
and more prosperous time periods appear to be associated with lower assault rates committed 
by adults. The conclusion of a crime reducing impact of wealth is confirmed by most 
estimated coefficients on GDP for other types of crime (see Tables A4 to A7, Appendix), 
although only robbery is affected in a significant way (at conventional significance levels). 
For juveniles, too, in most cases no significant effect from varying GDP p.c. on crime has 
been found. Significant coefficients are only reported for aggravated assaults (Model 1, 
positive sign) and for robbery (Model 2, negative sign), such that the overall conclusion 
would be that there is almost no significant marginal influence stemming from higher or 
lower wealth in particular regions.  
The impact of migration rates is mixed, however with the number of insignificant results 
exceeding the significant ones. While for aggravated assaults Model 1 shows a positive sign 
for adults, Model 2 reveals a negative sign for juveniles. Pre-empting the discussion of the 
remaining types of crime, only 5 out of 36 estimations (6 types of crimes, 6 estimations each) 
showed significance of migration, out of which 3 were positive and 2 negative. Thus, we 
cannot conclude from our data that higher migration rates are associated with more crime.  
Table 6 contains a summary of all results in which the types of crime are pooled in two 
general categories: murder and manslaughter, rape and indecent assault, together with 
aggravated assault are subsumed under ‘violent crimes’, and serious theft, petty theft and 
robbery are pooled as ‘property crimes’. Presented figures indicate the percentage of 
significant estimates being consistent with the economic theory of informal, custodial and 
non-custodial sentencing derived in Section 2. Inspecting results for the clearance rate, 67% 
(56%) of the estimates for property offences by adults (juveniles) are significantly negative (at 
the 5% level) and correspondingly consistent with the economic theory of crime, when 
relying on all econometric specifications (1) to (3) equally.30 Conversely, no contradictory 
result has been found. The same finding holds for violent crimes, but the share of negative 
coefficients is substantially smaller than for property crimes (less than 50%) which can be 
                                                 
 
30 Information criteria and R-squared suggest that Model 2 is dominated by Model 1. Skipping specification 2 
leads to percentages of significant values presented in parentheses in Table 6. This procedure would lead to 
generally higher shares of estimates confirming the deterrence hypothesis; see, in particular, sentencing rates. 
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attributed to the fact that violent offenses – not least because of the frequently immediate 
interaction and/or acquaintance of offender and victim – are solved relatively frequently in 
any case.  
[Table 6 about here] 
As already stated for theft and assault, the sentencing rate proves to be the most reliable 
deterrence indicator, both for property and violent offences. For the subsequent stages of the 
criminal prosecution process, however, robust deterrent effects in accordance with theory can 
be detected only for the education/correction-measure rate in property offences involving 
juveniles. For juvenile violent offenders, there are confirming but also significant 
contradicting effects, implying that more ‘lenient sentencing’ might likewise result in lower 
crime rates. Increasing the severity of punishment does not curb violent crime. There is rather 
a modest indication of the opposite ‘building criminal capital behind bars’ effect as longer 
prison terms are associated with significantly higher crime rates in one specification of each 
age group. Thus, summing up, the most important insight is that a deterrent effect on potential 
offenders is exerted especially by the first two stages of the criminal prosecution process.  
IV estimates were made use of in only 2 of 36 cases, these being in Models 1 and 2 for petty 
theft by juveniles. The fact that instrumentation was necessary precisely in the case of petty 
theft by juveniles and results in quantitatively substantial and statistically highly significant 
coefficients of the clearance rate is an interesting result, since petty theft is heavily dominated 
by shop theft amongst juveniles and can, as stated above, be considered as the cause of an 
estimation bias on the coefficients of the clearance rate towards zero in OLS estimates, which 
indeed were insignificant. Otherwise, it is found that the available instruments possess no, or 
only limited, explanatory relevance for several offence groups (especially for murder and 
manslaughter). There is, however, evidence that endogeneity of the clearance rate bears no 
serious problems, except for petty theft by juveniles. This is attested to by the fact that in 
cases where relevant and exogenous instruments could be found (see, for instance, robberies 
of adults) tests did not show any indication of endogenous clearance rates. 
 
4.3. Discussion of ratio bias  
The crime data used stem from official crime statistics and correspondingly reflect only the 
volume of crime registered by police and not the actual incidence of crime. If there is a 
problem of dark figures (which could be substantial for most offence groups according to 
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victim studies, cf., e.g.  Forschungsgruppe Baden-Wuerttemberg, 1998) both the crime rate 
and the clearance rate will be flawed by measurement errors, in the case of dependent 
variables (registered cases/ inhabitants) affecting the numerator and in the case of the 
explanatory variables (cleared cases / registered cases) the denominator. Thus, if, in 
accordance with the economic theory of crime, it is assumed that the actual effect of the 
clearance rate on the crime rate is negative, the constellation described above – also known as 
ratio bias – might lead to an exaggeration of the deterrent effect of clearance. Estimated 
coefficients of the sentence rate might likewise be influenced by the ratio bias. A possible 
reason can be seen in the ‘redefinition’31 of criminal cases in the course of the criminal 
prosecution process since information from the police is used for the crime rate in the 
numerator, and the sentencing rate (persons sentenced / suspects) is composed of both police 
statistics in the denominator and information from the courts in the numerator. If redefinition 
relating to certain offences is a quantitative problem, a potential for a spurious negative 
correlation between crime rate and sentencing rate arises because a high degree of redefinition 
simultaneously signifies higher crime rates and lower sentencing rates.  
Griliches and Hausman (1986) present a method that estimates the extent of the measurement 
error problem in explanatory variables of panel data, and, where necessary, helps correcting 
potential inconsistencies. The intuitive element of this approach lies in the fact that the 
magnitude of the bias induced by the measurement error depends on the choice of estimation 
model. Estimations based on differenced data have the tendency to magnify the measurement 
error problem as a large amount of true information (signal) is removed from the data, 
resulting in the variance of differenced variables being characterised to a larger degree by 
measurement errors (noise) compared to variables in levels. Accordingly, differenced 
variables based on more distant time periods (Xt-Xt-j, with j>1) ought to contain more 
substantial information and are thus less influenced by measurement errors than variables in 
first differences. Accordingly, it is to be expected that estimated coefficients display 
diminishing biases when the time lag between current and past realisations of the variables 
increases. While Griliches and Hausman consider the case of measurement errors in 
explanatory variables, Levitt (1988a) extends the approach to the problem of the ratio bias 
                                                 
 
31 ‘Redefinition’ describes the process whereby the original police classification of an offence, which, in case of 
doubt, is based on assumption of the most serious circumstances, can be subject to another (generally less 
serious) classification at subsequent stages of the prosecution process (by public prosecutors or in court), such 
that a person who is a suspected murder in records documented by the police, for example, might eventually be 
documented as aggravated assault in statistics on convictions. 
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relevant to crime studies and arrives at the following formula for the asymptotic inconsistency 
of the coefficient of the deterrence variable of interest:32 
(4.4)    
2
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In the context of the present study, ˆ jβ  refers to the estimator of β  of the clearance and/or 
sentencing rate, 2γσ  is the variance of the registration rate (= 1-dark figure) or redefinition 
rate, 2/a cσ  the variance and ρ the serial correlation of the true clearance and/or sentencing rate. 
From equation (4.4) it is clear that the measurement error problem does not necessarily lead – 
as is the case with Grilliches and Hausman – to some bias of the estimation coefficient 
towards zero, but rather that in the case of 0 1β> > −  there is a negative bias of the already 
negative coefficients, resulting in an overestimation of the deterrent effect. However, the 
higher the time lag j is, the lower this bias becomes, assuming the likely case of some positive 
serial correlation of the clearance and sentencing rates. The coefficients of the suspected 
variables (for 0 1β> > − ) should, therefore, prove to be more strongly negative in an 
estimation model with first differences based on lag j=1 than in differenced models with j=2, 
and in a model with j=2 more strongly negative than in a model with j=3 etc.  
Table 7 contains estimation results for clearance and sentencing rates obtained with models in 
ascending (j=1, 2, 3, 4, 8) time lags. Coefficients of the clearance rate diminishing across the 
estimates occur only for serious theft by adults. Surprisingly, the opposite result, i.e. 
increasing coefficients, appears for murder and manslaughter. The ratio bias could also be 
responsible for this result, for if the true coefficient of the clearance rate is smaller than ‘-1’, 
the bias from equation (4.4) has a positive sign, such that the effects become more strongly 
negative when differences are based on a longer space of time – as observed here.33 A further 
substantial explanation is found in the delayed reaction of the crime rate to changes in the 
clearance probability, for which Levitt (1998a, p. 358) offers two explanations; the 
information deficit of potential offenders and long-term prison sentences of repeat 
                                                 
 
32 Levitt (1998a) discusses the ratio bias using the example of the arrest rate in the USA. This study can be 
applied directly to the clearance and sentencing rates of the present study.  
33 For 1β < −  (in addition to the presently less relevant case 1β > ) the measurement error problem causes a 
corresponding distortion of βˆ  towards zero, as in Griliches and Hausman (1986). 
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offenders.34 In the case of the sentencing rate it seems evident that the estimation results for 
aggravated assault and robbery by adults and for murder and manslaughter by juveniles are 
influenced by the ratio bias. Moreover, for rape and sexual harassment (adults) and for 
robbery (juveniles) steadily increasing coefficients are present, a fact which also points to 
ratio bias, in as far as the true coefficients are less than ‘-1’. 
[Table 7 about here] 
Summing up, with regard to the relevance of the ratio bias for the set of all 17 coefficients 
which were weakly significant (at the 10% significance level) according to the specification in 
first differences (Model 3), it can be maintained that the bias may have led to overestimations 
in 4 of the 17 coefficients of the clearance and sentencing rates, and in 4 cases to 
underestimations of the deterrent effect. In the 9 remaining cases there is no indication of 
ratio bias. Thus, the ratio bias does not represent a general problem, although it must be taken 
account of in individual cases.  
 
5. Conclusions  
This study comprises the first comprehensive analysis of the deterrent effect of criminal 
prosecution in the Federal Republic of Germany. ‘Comprehensive’ means that the entire 
criminal prosecution process from the police investigation to the judge’s verdict is illustrated 
and analyzed using unique data, and is subsequently related to crime rates from six offence 
groups representing the ‘classic crimes’. A further innovation is the separate assessment of 
adults and juveniles, for whom two distinct models of varyingly repressive sanctions are 
provided, the general penal code and the juvenile penal code. Several problems with potential 
detrimental influence on the quality of estimations ranging from the persistence of time series 
in crime panel data to simultaneity and measurement-error problems have been tested and 
addressed as comprehensively as possible.  
The results show that a deterrent effect is exerted by the first two stages of the criminal 
prosecution process. Accordingly, a crime reducing impact would be obtained for higher 
clearance rates, in particular for crimes against property. The clearest results, however, are 
                                                 
 
34 “First, if criminals are poorly informed about the true likelihood of arrest, one might expect to observe a 
gradual change in criminal behavior in response to increased law enforcement. Second, if criminals are repeat 
offenders, the fact that some criminals arrested in one year are convicted and serve prison terms that run into the 
following year leads to a dependence of this year’s crime rate on last year’s arrest rate”. 
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obtained for the sentencing rate, i.e. the product of the indictment rate and the conviction rate. 
Their effects prove to be significantly negative for crimes involving violence and property in 
the large majority of all tested specifications. Conversely, for the indicators of the severity of 
punishment (type and extent of punishment) no robust deterrent effects could be detected. 
Thus, as suggested by the theoretical framework of this article, the answer to the question ‘Is 
being soft-on-crime the solution to rising crime rates?’ is twofold: ‘Being soft’ by increasing 
the use of informal sanctioning does not seem to be a promising criminal policy, whereas 
‘being soft’ by driving custodial sentences back in favor of non-custodial sentences proved to 
be successful, as no significant (adverse) effect from increasing the share of offenders being 
on probation or being fined on crime can be observed, while future costs due to increasing 
prison populations, stigmatization and accumulation of criminal capital have been avoided. 
This conclusion might support the prevailing opinion of many European criminologists and 
experts, in particular for juvenile crime. A more far-reaching hypothesis suggesting that the 
deterrent effect of criminal prosecution is generally marginal must, however, be abandoned.  
Thus, a corresponding implication for European law-and-order policy is to be found in the 
recommendation of a critical examination of the social desirability of the increasing use of 
diversion by public prosecutors, i.e. of dropping cases for reasons of the so-called expediency 
principle. Against the background of high social costs of crime in general and currently rising 
costs due to aggravated assaults in particular (see general trends in Section 2), it is 
questionable whether this tendency of public prosecution is actually economically and 
socially expedient. 
Thus, ‘general deterrence’ is capable of curbing crime rates, but just by a more rigorous 
application of existing penal laws rather than by reforms extending the severity of measures. 
The latter strategy, followed in the U.S., would bear the risk that the prison population 
increases without any effect of deterrence. However, criminalizing large parts of the 
population might cause some ‘crime-bears-crime’ problems, as peer effects and social 
interaction among inmates worsen future legal prospects of released offenders. Recidivism of 
a steadily growing group of repeat offenders, however, might ceteris paribus lead to 
permanent inflows into the criminal justice system and overloaded prison capacities. It seems 
as if the U.S. criminal policy is caught within such dynamics. European policy, on its part, 
should avoid the error of playing down the risk of its own vicious circle of (violent) crime. 
Cutting back some diversion reforms such as the exaggerated practice of dropping cases for 
reasons of expediency, for example, might prevent much harsher future measures that would 
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become necessary in response to public pressure when rates of violent crime are going to 
continue their current upward trend. 
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FIGURES 
Figure 1: Theft in Germany, 1963 - 2005 
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Notes: Reported cases of theft (serious theft plus petty theft) per 100,000 inhabitants; Source: GESIS-
ZUMA (2007), PCS 
 
Figure 2: Violent Crime in Germany, 1963 – 2005 
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Notes: Reported cases per 100,000 inhabitants; violent crime summarizes murder/ manslaughter, rape 
and sexual offences, robbery and assault; Source: GESIS-ZUMA (2007), PCS 
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Figure 3: Serious theft by adults (21-60 years) in the federal states of former West Germany 
(except Berlin), 1977-2001  
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Notes: Cases per 100,000 inhabitants of the age group; presentation on the basis of PCS and Spengler 
(2004) 
 
Figure 4: Clearance rate for serious theft in selected federal states of former West Germany 
1977-2001  
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Notes: Solved cases as share of registered cases; presentation on the basis of PCS and Spengler (2004) 
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Figure 5: Sentencing of serious theft as subject to the general penal code (adults aged from 
21 to under 60 years) in selected federal states of former West Germany 1977-2001 
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Notes: Presentation on the basis of PCS, StVStat and Spengler (2004) All rates are depicted as proportional 
values. For explanatory legend see Figure 4. 
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TABLES 
Table 1: The development of the sanctioning practice in Western Germany, 1977 – 2001 
 
 
 
Serious Theft 
(1)  
Share of reported 
crimes cleared by 
the police 
(clearance rate) 
(2)  
Share of suspects 
brought to court 
(indictment rate) 
(3)  
Share of 
defendants 
convicted in a trial 
(conviction rate) 
(4)  
Share of convicts 
with unconditional 
imprisonment 
(imprisonment 
rate) 
(5) 
Share of convicts 
with prison 
sentence on 
probation 
(probation rate) 
(6) 
Share of convicts 
with financial fine 
(fine rate) 
(7) 
Share of 
adolescents (19-21) 
convicted 
according to adult 
penal law 
1977-1981 19.3 46.5 85.2 41.1 38.2 20.7 13.5 
1982-1986 17.7 44.0 83.3 35.1 42.0 22.9 9.2 
1987-1992 15.0 37.4 80.3 32.7 43.4 23.9 7.1 
1993-1997 12.9 36.1 81.0 31.6 42.9 25.5 9.9 
1998-2001 13.3 35.4 81.3 36.3 42.5 21.1 10.1 
Aggravated 
Assault        
1977-1981 86.2 35.1 64.0 10.1 20.9 69.0 29.7 
1982-1986 85.6 34.7 63.4 11.2 23.9 64.8 20.2 
1987-1992 84.0 31.2 61.1 10.6 24.3 65.1 15.8 
1993-1997 83.5 30.3 63.4 10.4 29.2 60.4 15.7 
1998-2001 85.0 30.4 63.6 14.7 49.7 35.5 10.8 
Notes: Average rates (in percent) of listed time periods; rates of clearance, indictment and conviction refer to the total of all age groups (at least 14 
years of age), rates of imprisonment, probation and fine refer to the adult penal law (21 years and older). Data sources: PCS and StVStat.   
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Table 2: Discretionary sanctioning practices at the state level: Bavaria versus Schleswig-
Holstein 
  Bavaria Schleswig-Holstein 
 1977-1990 1991-2001 1977-1990 1991-2001 
Murder/ Manslaughter 28.0 28.0 23.0 27.4 
Rape and indecent ass. 29.7 28.8 24.3 21.1 
Robbery 29.3 29.1 30.8 25.6 
Aggravated assault 19.5 19.7 19.4 14.2 
Petty theft 37.0 38.1 46.4 26.4 
S e n t e n c i n g   r a t e 
Serious theft 35.9 31.6 43.5 27.0 
     
Murder/ Manslaughter 93.8 93.4 93.1 95.1 
Rape and indecent ass. 60.3 55.0 54.0 49.5 
Robbery 72.6 63.5 64.2 48.0 
Aggravated assault 12.0 14.0 10.4 10.6 
Petty theft 8.6 7.2 3.8 2.8 
I m
 p r i s o n m
 e n t    r a t e 
Serious theft 44.2 35.2 32.7 25.2 
     
Murder/ Manslaughter 23.2 25.4 19.6 24.5 
Rape and indecent ass. 5.1 5.7 3.0 3.1 
Robbery 5.4 4.9 4.3 2.4 
Aggravated assault 0.26 0.40 0.23 0.20 
Petty theft 0.10 0.08 0.05 0.02 
Expected  length  of im
prisonm
ent 
(in m
onths) 
Serious theft 0.58 0.41 0.38 0.13 
Notes: Rates are adjusted for changes in the structure of the German residential population and 
restricted to the age group of 21 to under 60 years (see the text for details); entries represent averages 
of denoted time periods in per cent. Sentencing rate = (indictment rate) x (conviction rate); expected 
length of imprisonment = (clearance rate) x (indictment rate) x (conviction rate) x (imprisonment rate) 
x (average length of imprisonment). 
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Table 3: The influence of P(prison| arrest)x on crime category ‘x’ in simple panel regressions 
Notes: Columns (1) to (5) cover 30 bivariate regressions (6 categories, 5 different econometric 
specifications) with crime category ‘C’ on the left-hand side and the corresponding probability of 
prison given arrest on the right-hand side of each equation; entries present estimated crime-specific 
coefficients and asymptotic standard errors (in parentheses) on P(prison| arrest) in time series 
(equation (1)) and panel regressions (equations (2)-(5)) of the period 1977 – 2001 and West German 
states (without Berlin); specifications in (1) to (4) use log-log specifications, estimations in column (5) 
are based on growth rates. F-tests confirm the existence of included fixed and period effects. **) 
denotes significance at the conventional 1%-significance level.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 Dependent variables 
 log(crimeC) 
 
(1) 
log( crimeC) 
 
(2) 
log(crimeC) 
 
(3) 
log(crimeC) 
 
(4) 
∆ log(crimeC)
 
(5) 
log P(prison| arrest)C: 
 
• Murder/ 
manslaughter 
 
• Rape 
 
 
• Robbery 
 
 
• Aggravated 
Assault 
 
• Petty theft 
 
 
• Serious theft 
 
 
Panel data 
 
State effects 
 
Year effects 
 
Growth rates of  
P(prison| arrest) 
 
No of obs. 
 
 
-0.378** 
(0.173) 
 
0.077 
(0.120) 
 
-1.411** 
(0.254) 
 
0.201 
(0.114) 
 
-0.294** 
(0.050) 
 
-0.810** 
(0.098) 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
 
25 
 
 
-0.411** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.529** 
(0.062) 
 
-1.326** 
(0.117) 
 
-0.366** 
(0.042) 
 
-0.267** 
(0.051) 
 
-0.746** 
(0.106) 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
no 
 
no 
 
 
242 
 
 
-0.234** 
(0.042) 
 
-0.102** 
(0.033) 
 
-0.685** 
(0.064) 
 
-0.079** 
(0.027) 
 
-0.142** 
(0.020) 
 
-0.635** 
(0.038) 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
no 
 
 
242 
 
 
-0.246** 
(0.043) 
 
-0.122** 
(0.031) 
 
-0.234** 
(0.047) 
 
-0.112** 
(0.026) 
 
0.010 
(0.021) 
 
-0.174** 
(0.037) 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
 
242 
 
 
-0.234 
(0.031)** 
 
-0.151** 
(0.022) 
 
-0.129** 
(0.029) 
 
-0.056** 
(0.015) 
 
-0.191** 
(0.024) 
 
-0.305** 
(0.040) 
 
yes 
 
no 
 
no 
 
yes 
 
 
232 
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Table 4: Regression results for serious theft  
 
 Adults Juveniles 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lagged dep. var. .4960** (.0520) 
.4507** 
(.0802) – 
.5977** 
(.0553) 
.6368** 
(.0621) – 
Clearance rate -1.322** (.2003) 
-.9829** 
(.2612) 
-1.507** 
(.3568) 
-1.083** 
(.3120) 
-.2993 
(.3333) 
-.7323 
(.4513) 
Sentencing rate -.6062** (.0824) 
-.2935** 
(.1116) 
-.8269** 
(.1560) 
-.4099** 
(.1297) 
-.0207 
(.1221) 
-.6336** 
(.1427) 
Probation rate .4396* (.1781) 
.3562 
(.2034) 
.3632 
(.2246) 
.4986 
(.3253) 
.1198 
(.2739) 
.1966 
(.2751) 
Fine rate -.0094 (.2806) 
-.0014 
(.2424) 
.3055 
(.3052) – – – 
Rate of educational and disciplinary measures – – – .7211** (.2534) 
.1140 
(.2262) 
.4938* 
(.2252) 
ln(length of imprisonment) -.1204 (.0635) 
-.1603* 
(.0642) 
.0109 
(.0757) 
.0898 
(.0826) 
-.0733 
(.0684) 
.1262 
(.0730) 
ln(number of per-diem fines) .0597 (.0715) 
.0759 
(.0726) 
-.1106* 
(.0546) – – – 
ln(per-capita GDP) -.3357* (.1548) 
-.0562 
(.1450) 
-.5498 
(.2942) 
.2692 
(.1842) 
.0421 
(.2785) 
.5230 
(.4517) 
Unemployment rate 1.576* (.6168) 
1.907** 
(.6040) 
1.327 
(1.829) 
1.680* 
(.7834) 
1.401 
(.8375) 
1.438 
(1.582) 
Rate of migrants .3269 (.7722) 
.1622 
(.8004) 
-2.420 
(2.042) 
-.5431 
(.9115) 
.0313 
(.9723) 
-2.426 
(1.867) 
Testing exclusion of instruments .2399 .6512 .0018 .1719 .3440 .0001 
Testing overidentifying restrictions .0498 .2679 .0999 .0360 .0192 .0833 
Endogeneity test of clearance rate .057 .375 .123 .232 .924 .963 
Number of observations 232 235 232 234 237 234 
R2 .9930 .9909 .6769 .9863 .9837 .4551 
 
Notes: Calculations on the basis of PCS, StVStat and Spengler (2004). All estimations contain state-specific constants 
and time dummies (two-way fixed effects), heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard errors in 
parentheses. ’**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at the 1% and 5% level, respectively. At the bottom of the table the p-
values of three standard tests in the context of IV regressions are provided. The tests are needed because for a 2SLS 
approach to be valid, the instruments have to be correlated with the endogenous explanatory variable and at the same 
time uncorrelated with the error term of the IV regression. But even if the former requirements are met the IV 
approach should only be used if the presumed endogenous explanatory variable is indeed endogenous because the 
2SLS estimator is less efficient than OLS if the explanatory variables are exogenous. Following this logic the test of 
excluded instruments is the F-test of whether the four (potential) instruments are jointly significant in the first-stage 
regression of a 2SLS model, i.e. if the instruments are relevant determinants of the clearance rate. The Hansen-Sargan 
test of overidentifying restrictions has the joint null hypothesis that the instruments are valid instruments, i.e., 
uncorrelated with the error term, and that the excluded instruments are correctly excluded from the estimated equation. 
Under the null, the test statistic is distributed as chi-squared in the number of overidentifying restrictions. A rejection 
casts doubt on the validity of the instruments. The endogeneity test of the clearance rate is performed as a simple 
regression test recommended by Wooldridge (2002). In a first step the clearance rate is regressed on all exogenous 
variables (including those in the structural, i.e. crime, regression and the additional IVs) and the residuals 
(e_hat_clearance) are extracted. In a second step we add e_hat_clearance to the crime regression (which also includes 
the clearance rate) and test for significance of e_hat_clearance using OLS. If the coefficient on e_hat_clearance 
(indicated by the t-statistics) is statistically different from zero, we conclude that the clearance rate is indeed 
endogenous. 
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Table 5: Regression results for aggravated assaults 
 Adults Juveniles 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lagged dep. var. .5975** 
(.0527) 
.6927** 
(.0598) 
 .6422** 
(.0488) 
.6932** 
(.0551) 
 
Clearance rate -.2408 
(.2654) 
.2956 
(.3008) 
-.1138 
(.5130) 
-1.024** 
(.3902) 
.1708 
(.4570) 
-1.585** 
(.5629) 
Sentencing rate -1.876** 
(.2586) 
-.0333 
(.2811) 
-1.602** 
(.2368) 
-.6476** 
(.1058) 
-.0668 
(.1411) 
-.5337** 
(.1101) 
Probation rate .0200 
(.2128) 
-.0416 
(.2305) 
.1000 
(.2617) 
-.5421 
(.3109) 
.5188 
(.3182) 
-.7118** 
(.2568) 
Fine rate .0469 
(.1886) 
-.2189 
(.2143) 
.3135 
(.2603) 
– – – 
Rate of educational and 
disciplinary measures 
– – – -.5239* 
(.2258) 
.3288 
(.2439) 
-.5240* 
(.2074) 
ln(length of imprisonment) .0873** 
(.0296) 
.0649 
(.0369) 
.0245 
(.0249) 
-.0324 
(.0374) 
.0093 
(.0409) 
-.0229 
(.0286) 
ln(number of per-diem fines) .0797 
(.0771) 
.0925 
(.0851) 
-.0536 
(.1053) 
– – – 
ln(per-capita GDP) -.0260 
(.1702) 
-.0632 
(.1509) 
-.0720 
(.2648) 
.5207* 
(.2508) 
.1336 
(.3241) 
.4335 
(.4581) 
Unemployment rate -1.247* 
(.5343) 
-.7293 
(.5016) 
-1.078 
(1.386) 
1.336 
(.9644) 
1.380 
(1.198) 
.4646 
(1.703) 
Rate of migrants 2.431** 
(.7178) 
.0011 
(.9175) 
.0023 
(1.610) 
-1.285 
(1.276) 
-1.971* 
(.9481) 
2.121 
(2.563) 
Testing exclusion of 
instruments 
.1120 .1037 .0071 .000 .0100 .0025 
Testing overidentifying 
restrictions 
.0804 .4541 .3274 .8514 .7393 .4131 
Endogeneity test of clearance 
rate 
.693 .431 .154 .841 .275 .464 
Number of observations 232 235 232 227 231 225 
R2 .9666 .9551 .3372 .9812 .9777 .3252 
Notes: See Table 4. 
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Table 6: Proportion (in %) of significant coefficients on deterrence indicators, by type of 
offence, age-group and concordance with the economic theory of crime 
 Violent offences Property offences 
 Adults Juveniles Adults Juveniles 
 pro contra pro contra pro contra Pro contra 
Clearance rate  33 (50) 0 33 (50) 0 67 (50) 0 56 (50) 11 (17) 
Sentencing rate 67 (100) 0 67 (100) 0 78 (100) 0 56 (83) 0 
Probation rate 0 0 0 11 (17) 11 (17) 0 0 0 
Fine rate 0 0 – – 17 (25) 0 – – 
Juvenile educ./correc. rate – – 33 (50) 33 (50) – – 33 (50) 0 
Length of imprisonment 0 11 (17) 0 11 (17) 11 (0) 0 0 0 
Number of per-diem fines 0 0 – – 17 (25) 0 – – 
Notes: Calculations on the basis of PCS, StVStat and Spengler (2004). Figures represent percentage of estimated 
coefficients that confirm (‘pro’) or contradict (‘contra’) theoretically expected signs (see Section 2) of the 
deterrence hypothesis (at least) at the 5% significance level. Entries summarize econometric Models 1 to 3, and 
Models 1 and 3 (in parentheses), respectively. Sentencing to fines is applied for adults only, and 
educational/correctional measures are limited to the juvenile penal law.   
 
 
Table 7: Estimation coefficients for clearance and sentencing rates from models in 
differences with increasing time lags (ratio bias tests)  
  Adults Juveniles 
  j=1 J=1 j=3 j=4 j=8 j=1 j=1 j=3 j=4 j=8 
Clearance rate           
Murder and 
manslaughter 
-.597** 
(.294) 
-.637** 
(.309) 
-.704** 
(.335) 
-.774** 
(.356) 
-.975** 
(.480) 
-.932 
(.812) 
-2.40** 
(1.00) 
-3.14*** 
(1.17) 
-3.26*** 
(1.11) 
-4.71** 
(2.26) 
Rape and indecent 
assault 
-.491*** 
(.130) 
-.459*** 
(.129) 
-.418*** 
(.145) 
-.410** 
(.173) 
-.593*** 
(.192) 
.381 
(.397) 
.545 
(.430) 
.540 
(.532) 
.731 
(.635) 
1.19 
(.832) 
Aggravated assault -.114 
(.513) 
-.322 
(.589) 
-.334 
(.604) 
-.304 
(.626) 
-.123 
(.652) 
-1.59*** 
(.563) 
-1.45** 
(.590) 
-1.44** 
(.689) 
-1.45* 
(.788) 
-1.04 
(1.08) 
Robbery -.269 
(.187) 
-.353 
(.215) 
-.398 
(.246) 
-.369 
(.266) 
-.229 
(.302) 
-.379 
(.475) 
-.270 
(.510) 
-.132 
(.514) 
-.017 
(.528) 
-.437 
(.551) 
Serious theft -1.51*** 
(.357) 
-1.37*** 
(.387) 
-1.28*** 
(.413) 
-1.18*** 
(.439) 
-.449 
(.552) 
-.732 
(.451) 
-.023 
(.479) 
.366 
(.494) 
.643 
(.515) 
1.69*** 
(.596) 
 
Petty theft .015 
(.211) 
-.024 
(.252) 
-.060 
(.276) 
-.109 
(.288) 
-.233 
(.328) 
.663** 
(.296) 
.592* 
(.348) 
.403 
(.369) 
.225 
(.373) 
-.228 
(.418) 
Sentencing rate           
Murder and 
manslaughter 
-1.07*** 
(.107) 
-1.04*** 
(.119) 
-1.06*** 
(.127) 
-1.10*** 
(.133) 
-1.39*** 
(.269) 
-1.13*** 
(.149) 
-1.10*** 
(.164) 
-.969*** 
(.188) 
-.878*** 
(.232) 
-.605 
(.376) 
Rape and indecent 
assault 
-.866*** 
(.091) 
-.940*** 
(.091) 
-.974*** 
(.102) 
-.980*** 
(.115) 
-1.09*** 
(.131) 
-1.02*** 
(.104) 
-1.08*** 
(.124) 
-1.12*** 
(.144) 
-1.09*** 
(.159) 
-1.20*** 
(.223) 
Aggravated assault -1.60*** 
(.237) 
-1.52*** 
(.228) 
-1.48*** 
(.218) 
-1.45*** 
(.210) 
-1.20*** 
(.199) 
-.534*** 
(.110) 
-.554*** 
(.136) 
-.557*** 
(.162) 
-.563*** 
(.183) 
-.691*** 
(.259) 
Robbery -.577*** 
(.173) 
-.536*** 
(.152) 
-.519*** 
(.157) 
-.494*** 
(.158) 
-.328** 
(.152) 
-.878*** 
(.140) 
-.962*** 
(.132) 
-1.02*** 
(.140) 
-1.06*** 
(.145) 
-1.10*** 
(.152) 
Serious theft -.827*** 
(.156) 
-.835*** 
(.154) 
-.825*** 
(.167) 
-.811*** 
(.179) 
-.577** 
(.219) 
-.634*** 
(.143) 
-.697*** 
(.147) 
-.700*** 
(.155) 
-.695*** 
(.165) 
-.638*** 
(.230) 
 
Petty theft -.673*** 
(.137) 
-.739*** 
(.148) 
-.735*** 
(.148) 
-.746*** 
(.151) 
-.878*** 
(.134) 
-.579*** 
(.202) 
-.791*** 
(.244) 
-.852*** 
(.258) 
-.894*** 
(.273) 
-.839** 
(.361) 
Notes: Calculations on the basis of PCS, StVStat and Spengler (2004). All estimations contain state-specific 
constants and time dummies (two-way fixed effects), heteroskedasticity and autocorrelation-robust standard 
errors in parentheses. ‘***’, ‘**’ and ‘*’ represent significance at the 1%, 5% and 10% level. 
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APPENDIX 
 
Proof of results provided in Section 2. 
 
a) Maximize expected utility: 
(A1) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]| |(1 ) ibs c s c i iE U p p U A L t G t p p U A G t F t= − + + + + −  A  
   ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1 ip U A L t G t+ − + +A  
Thus, three different payoffs need to be distinguished. Define  
( ) ( )
1 iY A L t G t= + +A , ( ) ( )2 b iY A L t G t= + +A , ( ) ( )3 i iY A G t F t= + −  
Using the implicit function theorem, we first define 
  
( ) ( ) ( )
1|(1 ) i
i
i s c
E U
E p p U Y G t
t
∂ ′ ′= = −
∂
( ) ( ) ( )[ ]
2| i is cp p U Y G t F t′ ′ ′+ −
   ( ) ( ) ( )
3
1 0
i
p U Y G t′ ′+ − =  
The second-order condition is 
(A2) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )21 1| |(1 ) (1 )i iii s c s cE p p U Y G t p p U Y G t′′ ′ ′ ′′= − + −    
   ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2
2| i is cp p U Y G t F t′′ ′ ′+ − ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]2| i is cpp U Y G t F t′ ′′ ′′+ −  
   ( ) ( ) ( )2
3
1 ip U Y G t′′ ′+ − ( ) ( ) ( )31 ip U Y G t′ ′′+ −  
0iiE < ⇔  assumptions I to III hold, i.e.   
• 0U ′′ <   
• ( ) 0iG t′′ <   
• ( ) 0iF t >′′    
 
 
b) The effect of detection and conviction: 
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )1 2 3| |(1 )
i
i
i
i i i ii
ii
s c s c
E
p U Y G t p U Y G t F t U Y G tt p
Ep E
t
∂
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− + − −∂ ∂= − = −∂∂
∂
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(A3) 
( ) ( ) ( )( ) ( ) ( ) ( )( )1 3 2| |(1 )i i i
ii
s c s cG t p U Y U Y p U Y G t F t
E
′ ′ ′ ′ ′ ′− − + −= −  
0i
t
p
∂ < ⇔∂  
• ( ) ( ) 0i iG t F t′ ′− <           (assumption IV) 
• ( ) ( )3 1 0bY Y L t L t− = − >A A    ( ) ( )1 3|(1 0)s cp U Y U Y′ ′⇒ − − <          
(assumption of ‘stigma’) 
Properties (2.6) follow from (A3). 
 
 
c) The effect of non-custodial sentencing: 
|
|
(1 )
(1 )
i
s ci
s c ii
E
pt
p E
∂
∂ −∂ = −∂ −
( ) ( ) ( ) ( ) ( )[ ]1 2i i i
ii
pU Y G t pU Y G t F t
E
′ ′ ′ ′ ′− −=−
 
( ) ( )
( ) 0
+ − −=− >−  
Again, the unambiguous sign depends on the validity of Assumption IV.  
 
d) Finally, the crime reducing effect of the gap ( ) ( )bL t L t−A A  (‘stigma’) is obvious from 
(A1) and from 0iiE < .  
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Table A1: Descriptive statistics of offence-specific variables  
Notes: Calculations on the basis of PCS, StVStat and Spengler (2004). The crime rates of adults and juveniles are defined as: the (approximate) number of registered cases from 
the respective age group / 100,000 inhabitants of the respective age-group. The length of adult and juvenile prison sentences is given in months, and the number of per-diem fines 
in days. All other variables are proportional values. The prosecution indicators subject to the general penal code and juvenile penal code (especially the minima and maxima) can 
stand in contradiction to the statutory minimum and maximum sentence. As the StVStat applies only to the violated statute, the minima can lie under the minimum sentence. The 
maxima can lie above the maximum sentence since in the formation of concurrent sentences, which are the result of one person receiving several concurrent sentences for 
different offences (committed in conjunction with others), the only statistically registered offence is the one punished with the most severe sentence.  
 Murder and Manslaughter Rape and Indecent Assault Aggravated Assault Robbery Serious Theft Petty Theft 
Variable M. v. Std. dev. 
Range M. v. Std. 
dev 
Range M. v. Std. 
dev 
Range M. v. Std. 
dev. 
Range M. v. Std. 
dev 
Range M. v. Std. 
dev. 
Range 
Crime rate[21-60) 7.01 2.9 2.45-23.6 24.0 9.48 10.5-52.2 143 48.7 82.9-285 68.8 59.7 16.7-331 2436 1675 567-8315 1973 769 1034-4816 
Crime rate[14-18) 4.93 4.50 0-36.8 34.6 18.3 0-170 375 256 81.1-1296 441 686 58.8-3736 14755 10276 3918-
48444 
7422 3042 3777-17461 
Clearance rate .939 .039 .740-1 .684 .066 .469-.846 .839 .050 .671-.934 .492 .076 .291-.651 .155 .048 .062-.281 .471 .056 .327-.577 
Sentencing rate[21-60) .262 .107 .038-.833 .270 .072 .104-.600 .180 .034 .102-.292 .293 .059 .121-.509 .334 .082 .193-.699 .364 .073 .199-.614 
Imprisonment rate[21-60) .908 .063 .667-1 .543 .080 .235-.767 .108 .030 .017-.248 .622 .083 .346-.802 .347 .060 .197-.535 .053 .017 .019-.096 
Probation rate[21-60) .081 .057 0-.333 .436 .080 .219-.700 .282 .107 .116-.647 .362 .082 .193-.635 .426 .046 .306-.578 .093 .024 .050-.169 
Fines rate[21-60) .011 .031 0-.25 .021 .021 0-.118 .610 .122 .238-.822 .015 .013 0-.095 .227 .047 .114-.405 .854 .036 .766-.923 
Length of imprisonment[21-60) 91.9 13.6 48-143 39.7 7.39 23.2-79 14.9 3.00 5.25-24.1 42.0 6.33 22.6-61.4 15.6 1.86 10.8-21.9 6.79 1.21 4.08-10.8 
Number of per-diem fines[21-60) – – – – – – 60.8 19.5 30.6-107 – – – 82.8 9.82 51.8-109 26.8 5.71 14.7-41.3 
Sentencing rate[14-18) .346 .309 0-1 .326 .182 0-1 .269 .116 .031-.640 .400 .151 .075-.96 .303 .120 .038-.580 .194 .110 .005-.442 
Imprisonment rate[14-18) .893 .132 0-1 .313 .131 0-1 .082 .039 0-.292 .315 .096 .103-.691 .145 .046 .057-.402 .042 .024 .012-.144 
Probation  rate[14-18) .099 .126 0-1 .424 .142 0-1 .149 .057 0-.370 .394 .081 .051-.639 .209 .055 .036-.359 .063 .032 .008-.206 
Disciplinary means rate[14-18) .006 .036 0-.375 .222 .123 0-.6 .682 .108 .290-.906 .250 .104 .033-.606 .553 .108 .240-.768 .732 .149 .268-.930 
Corrective means rate[14-18) .002 .015 0-.167 .041 .064 0-.444 .087 .077 0-.442 .041 .047 0-.277 .094 .076 0-.369 .164 .126 0-.524 
Length of imprisonment[14-18) 68.5 11.0 27.6-90 29.2 8.82 6-90 18.4 3.87 6.5-32 25.6 5.20 13.8-42.8 18.7 2.68 10.8-26.6 15.8 3.17 8.4-48.8 
Proportion of attempts .674 .100 .218-.873 .351 .085 .153-.554 .064 .019 .026-.112 .210 .033 .112-.304 .173 .030 .091-.249 .016 .005 .009-.052 
Crime scenes < 20 thou. 
inhabitants 
.289 .189 0-.645 .261 .174 0-.566 .246 .163 0-.526 .157 .110 0-.369 .246 .162 0-.532 .230 .157 0-.466 
Crime scenes 20 thou.-100 thou. 
inhabitants 
.245 .143 0-.556 .251 .145 0-.612 .234 .134 0-.458 .243 .140 0-.513 .258 .147 0-.504 .261 .148 0-.525 
Crime scenes 100 thou.–500 thou. 
inhabitants 
.203 .108 0-.465 .210 .105 0-.578 .237 .114 0-.439 .265 .129 0-.499 .205 .096 0-.352 .222 .099 0-.345 
Crime scenes >= 500 thou.  
inhabitants 
.259 .325 0-1 .273 .321 0-.974 .283 .327 0-.998 .333 .318 .220-.996 .289 .336 0-.998 .277 .323 0-.990 
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Table A2: Descriptive statistics of socioeconomic variables 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Calculations on the basis Statistisches Bundesamt (various issues).  
 
 
Table A3: Unit root tests of dependent variables (p-values) 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Calculations on the basis of PCS, StVStat and Spengler (2004). The table contains p-values of the Im, 
Pesaran and Shin (2003) unit root tests applied for all dependent variables of the analysis – logarithmic crime 
rates in columns with the heading ‘Levels’ and first differences of the logarithmic crime rates in columns headed 
‘1st Differences’. Results are obtained using the Stata routine ipshin (Bornhorst and Baum 2001). The null 
hypothesis of the test is the non-stationarity of considered variables. Possible gaps in the time-series were closed 
using interpolation or extrapolation of the values since the test used is applicable to “balanced” panels only. Test 
variants 1 to 4 correspond to Dickey Fuller (DF) tests without trend (variant 1), DF tests with trend (variant 2), 
augmented Dickey Fuller test with lag=1, i.e. ADF(1) test, without trend (variant 3) and ADF(1) tests with trend 
(variant 4). 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Variable Mean Standard 
deviation 
Minimum Maximum 
Real per-capita GDP 22,972 5,734 14,892 40,968 
Unemployment rate .086 .032 .021 .168 
Foreign-national rate .079 .032 .029 .176 
  Adults Juveniles 
ln([Offence] / 100.000 inhabitants)  Variants Levels 1
st 
Differences 
Levels 1st 
Differences 
Murder and manslaughter 1 0 0 0 0 
 2 0 0 0 0 
 3 0 0 0 0 
 4 0 0 0 0 
Rape and indecent assault 1 0 0 0 0 
 2 0 0 0 0 
 3 .049 0 0 0 
 4 0 0 0 0 
Aggravated and grievous bodily harm 1 .020 0 .003 0 
 2 .042 0 0 0 
 3 .108 0 .062 0 
 4 .539 0 .045 0 
Robbery 1 0 0 .053 0 
 2 0 0 .002 0 
 3 .110 0 .284 0 
 4 .200 0 .152 0 
Serious theft 1 .005 0 .012 0 
 2 .094 0 .125 0 
 3 .024 0 .010 0 
 4 .106 0 .547 0 
Petty theft 1 .029 0 .001 0 
 2 .006 0 .011 0 
 3 .114 0 .021 0 
 4 .216 0 .659 0 
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Table A4:  Regression results for murder and manslaughter 
 Adults Juveniles 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lagged dep. var. .3604** 
(.0590) 
.3765** 
(.0849) 
– – – – 
Clearance rate -.5035 
(.4159) 
.6266 
(.4522) 
-.5974* 
(.2940) 
-1.795* 
(.8705) 
-.3031 
(1.321) 
-.9324 
(.8118) 
Sentencing rate -1.128** 
(.1331) 
.1595 
(.2204) 
-1.068** 
(.1074) 
-1.074** 
(.1148) 
.0208 
(.1405) 
-1.133** 
(.1488) 
Probation rate -.1484 
(.2022) 
.3175 
(.2230) 
-.1921 
(.1266) 
-.0194 
(.1707) 
.3918 
(.3245) 
-.2341 
(.2246) 
ln(length of imprisonment) .0310 
(.1210) 
.0376 
(.0901) 
.0510 
(.0853) 
.1104 
(.1707) 
-.1808 
(.1891) 
.4470* 
(.1803) 
ln(per-capita GDP) -1.100* 
(.4753) 
-.5973 
(.4440) 
-1.545* 
(.7280) 
1.331 
(.7241) 
.3161 
(.9610) 
1.790 
(2.044) 
Unemployment rate 1.328 
(1.925) 
2.406 
(1.723) 
.9681 
(2.732) 
8.632** 
(2.406) 
-1.408 
(3.924) 
12.01 
(8.111) 
Rate of migrants 2.141 
(2.067) 
2.825 
(1.853) 
3.928 
(4.373) 
9.135* 
(4.360) 
15.77** 
(5.204) 
-2.731 
(11.00) 
Testing exclusion of 
instruments 
.3064 .6140 .6280 .3278 .2786 .0324 
Testing overidentifying 
restrictions 
.7652 .7712 .9967 .8392 .9078 .4995 
Endogeneity test of clearance 
rate 
.000 .089 .035 .002 .930 .683 
Number of observations 232 235 232 193 186 159 
R2 .8471 .7884 .3226 .6695 .4809 .4854 
Notes: Financial fines and disciplinary/correctional measures do not apply for murder and manslaughter;  
otherwise, see Table 4. 
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Table A5:  Regression results for rape and indecent assault 
 Adults Juveniles 
Explanatory variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lagged dep. var. .4511** 
(.0761) 
.5029** 
(.0872) 
 .3047** 
(.0589) 
.3324** 
(.0934) 
 
Clearance rate -.4780* 
(.1953) 
.1756 
(.2051) 
-.4906** 
(.1302) 
-.4218 
(.4649) 
.4175 
(.5827) 
.3811 
(.3969) 
Sentencing rate -.9075** 
(.1327) 
.2752 
(.1896) 
-.8660** 
(.0905) 
-1.065** 
(.1287) 
.3382 
(.1785) 
-1.018** 
(.1036) 
Probation rate .0513 
(.1248) 
.0917 
(.1347) 
.0490 
(.0996) 
.1997 
(.1509) 
.1200 
(.1714) 
.0812 
(.1194) 
Rate of educational and 
disciplinary measures 
– – – .9137** 
(.1723) 
-.1747 
(.2171) 
.7455** 
(.1397) 
ln(length of imprisonment) -.0732 
(.0682) 
-.1206 
(.0629) 
.0338 
(.0561) 
-.0360 
(.0602) 
-.0011 
(.0523) 
-.0040 
(.0547) 
ln(per-capita GDP) -.1600 
(.2230) 
-.0262 
(.2347) 
-.4939 
(.4588) 
-.7788 
(.4408) 
-.3834 
(.7228) 
-.5949 
(.8966) 
Unemployment rate 1.336 
(.7492) 
.9409 
(.7302) 
1.532 
(1.576) 
1.158 
(1.918) 
.7547 
(2.249) 
6.424 
(3.955) 
Rate of migrants -1.132 
(.7915) 
-.7947 
(.8179) 
-3.185 
(2.130) 
1.478 
(2.489) 
4.598 
(3.173) 
-12.54 
(6.710) 
Testing exclusion of 
instruments 
.0342 .0272 .0925 .0407 .0799 .0390 
Testing overidentifying 
restrictions 
.8943 .5477 .5087 .0395 .7668 .9174 
Endogeneity test of clearance 
rate 
.975 .532 .672 .701 .180 .595 
Number of observations 232 235 232 219 221 209 
R2 .9377 .9221 .3662 .7610 .6381 .4454 
Notes: Fines do not apply for rape; otherwise, see Table 4.  
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Table A6:  Regression results for robbery  
 Adults Juveniles 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lagged dep. var. .6347** 
(.0498) 
.6237** 
(.0573) 
 .6810** 
(.0554) 
.5932** 
(.0635) 
 
Clearance rate -.4029* 
(.1741) 
-.4701* 
(.1980) 
-.2689 
(.1865) 
-1.347** 
(.4191) 
-1.609** 
(.4435) 
-.3787 
(.4748) 
Sentencing rate -.7656** 
(.1828) 
-.0308 
(.1558) 
-.5773** 
(.1728) 
-.9313** 
(.1460) 
-.1345 
(.1438) 
-.8779** 
(.1402) 
Probation rate -.1989 
(.1077) 
.1927 
(.1168) 
-.1562 
(.0982) 
-.0686 
(.1631) 
-.3161 
(.1911) 
.0492 
(.1759) 
Rate of educational and 
disciplinary measures 
– – – .4084 
(.2303) 
.0249 
(.1969) 
.4832* 
(.2379) 
ln(length of imprisonment) .0053 
(.0488) 
-.0654 
(.0447) 
.0634 
(.0558) 
.0225 
(.0904) 
-.2076 
(.1251) 
.1356 
(.0901) 
ln(per-capita GDP) -.3948** 
(.1511) 
-.3897** 
(.1484) 
.0236 
(.3752) 
.2165 
(.3042) 
-.7876* 
(.3495) 
.2644 
(.7152) 
Unemployment rate .7732 
(.5317) 
1.017 
(.5700) 
.0689 
(1.400) 
3.089** 
(1.159) 
1.108 
(1.288) 
4.123 
(2.555) 
Rate of migrants .4153 
(.6520) 
.2830 
(.6095) 
1.358 
(1.370) 
.6332 
(1.530) 
1.571 
(1.336) 
2.773 
(3.507) 
Testing exclusion of 
instruments 
.0000 .0000 .0859 .0025 .0037 .5461 
Testing overidentifying 
restrictions 
.5256 .4129 .5390 .1992 .8250 .0170 
Endogeneity test of clearance 
rate 
.802 .951 .993 .221 .457 .582 
Number of observations 232 235 232 234 237 234 
R2 .9897 .9885 .5162 .9802 .9776 .3925 
Notes: Financial fines do not apply for robbery; otherwise, see Table 4 
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Table A7: Regression results for petty theft 
 Adults Juveniles 
Explanatory Variables Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
Lagged dep. var. .6281** 
(.0649) 
.6292** 
(.0608) 
 .5837** 
(.0964) 
.5541** 
(.0693) 
 
Clearance rate -.0346 
(.1906) 
-.3483* 
(.1763) 
.0145 
(.2106) 
-2.392** 
(.8007) 
-2.365** 
(.7475) 
.6632* 
(.2958) 
Sentencing rate -.2822** 
(.0952) 
.1054 
(.0917) 
-.6726** 
(.1370) 
-.2568 
(.1855) 
.0586 
(.1696) 
-.5788** 
(.2017) 
Probation rate -1.082 
(.7119) 
-.4607 
(.7579) 
-.0056 
(.5342) 
-.5604 
(.5468) 
1.049 
(.5686) 
-.6452 
(.3878) 
Fine rate -.3167 
(.4979) 
-.4385 
(.5741) 
.8607* 
(.4283) 
– – – 
Rate of educational and 
disciplinary measures 
– – – .0104 
(.4128) 
.6374 
(.3430) 
.0377 
(.3896) 
ln(length of imprisonment) .0002 
(.0391) 
.0037 
(.0346) 
-.0223 
(.0301) 
.0418 
(.0478) 
-.0068 
(.0380) 
.0297 
(.0218) 
ln(number of per-diem fines) -.0508 
(.0557) 
.0383 
(.0538) 
-.0801 
(.0925) 
– – – 
ln(per-capita GDP) -.0014 
(.1106) 
-.0103 
(.0972) 
.0108 
(.1714) 
-.3126 
(.1608) 
-.1825 
(.1442) 
.2365 
(.2889) 
Unemployment rate .0950 
(.4303) 
.7179* 
(.3807) 
-.7620 
(1.164) 
2.475** 
(.9606) 
2.886** 
(.7916) 
-.9354 
(1.766) 
Rate of migrants .9348 
(.5872) 
.0788 
(.5186) 
-.9959 
(1.125) 
1.369 
(.8468) 
.6289 
(.8690) 
-1.132 
(1.444) 
Testing exclusion of 
instruments 
.0075 .0052 .0203 .0015 .0017 .0001 
Testing overidentifying 
restrictions 
.2637 .8506 .5292 .7125 .3206 .4668 
Endogeneity test of clearance 
rate 
.064 .892 .010 .001 .018 .454 
Number of observations 232 235 232 234 237 234 
R2 .9849 .9844 .6486 – – .4384 
Notes: See Table 4. 
 
